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Abstract
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names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
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Public pension funds have the potential to benefit from 
low operating costs because they enjoy economies of 
scale and avoid large marketing costs. But this important 
advantage has in most countries been dissipated by poor 
investment performance. The latter has been attributed to 
a weak governance structure, lack of independence from 
government interference, and a low level of transparency 
and public accountability.
   Recent years have witnessed the creation of new 
public pension funds in several countries, and the 
modernization of existing ones in others, with special 
emphasis placed on upgrading their investment policy 
framework and strengthening their governance structure. 
This paper focuses on the experience of four new public 
This paper—a product of the Financial Policy Division, Financial Systems Department—is part of a larger effort in the 
department to study the investment performance of public and private pension funds. Policy Research Working Papers 
are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at divttas@worldbank.org, 
gimpavido@imf.org, and roconnor@ntma.ie. 
pension funds that have been created in Norway, Canada, 
Ireland and New Zealand. 
  The paper discusses the safeguards that have been 
introduced to ensure their independence and their 
insulation from political pressures. It also reviews their 
performance and their evolving investment strategies. All 
four funds started with the romantic idea of operating as 
‘managers of managers’ and focusing on external passive 
management but their strategies have progressively 
evolved to embrace internal active management and 
significant investments in alternative asset classes. The 
paper draws lessons for other countries that wish to 
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 Executive Summary 
 
Introduction: Public pension funds have the potential to benefit from low operating 
costs because they enjoy economies of scale and avoid large marketing costs. But this 
important advantage has in most countries been dissipated by poor investment 
performance. The latter has been attributed to a weak governance structure, lack of 
independence from government interference, and a low level of transparency and public 
accountability. 
 
Recent years have witnessed the creation of new public pension funds in several 
countries, and the modernization of existing ones in others, with special emphasis placed 
on upgrading their investment policy framework and strengthening their governance 
structure. This paper focuses on the experience of four new public pension funds that 
have been created in Norway, Canada, Ireland and New Zealand.  
 
Poor Investment Performance: With some notable exceptions
1, public pension funds 
were historically poorly managed in most countries. They were often forced to invest in 
government bonds and housing loans at low nominal interest rates, while investments in 
foreign assets were prohibited. In countries that suffered from high inflation, real 
investment returns were negative, while even in countries where nominal interest rates 
exceeded inflation, the returns on public pension reserves were well below equity market 
returns and well below the returns achieved by private pension funds.     
 
In several countries public pension funds were even required to place all their 
accumulated reserves in non-marketable government securities, ‘earning’ an administered 
rate of return. This practice effectively transformed their assets into ‘notional’ reserves. 
As a result, the underlying pension plans were also effectively transformed from 
‘partially funded’ to completely ‘pay-as-you-go’ schemes, relying on future payroll 
contributions and government tax revenues for the payment of pensions. In the case of 
these funds, the question of creating a sound and efficient investment policy framework 
did not arise. 
 
A New Approach to Public Pension Fund Management: Faced with the growing 
financial pressures arising from changing demographics and the need to improve the 
investment performance of public pension funds, several countries around the world, 
mainly in the OECD, decided in the past 15 years or so to modernize the management of 
existing pension funds or to create new pension funds with substantial reserves to help 
finance the rising cost of public pensions. These countries included Norway, Canada, 
Ireland and New Zealand, all of which created new funds, transferred reserves, 
committed to make annual contributions, and promoted a modern framework for efficient 
investment performance. 
                                                 
1 Historically the main exceptions were the Caisse de Dépôt et Placement du Québec (CDPQ) in Canada 
and CALPERS and the Thrift Savings Plan (TSP) in the US. In the period since 1990, several other public 
pension funds have been able to significantly improve their investment performance. These include the 
Ontario Teachers Pension Plan (OTPP) in Canada and, among European funds, the ABP in the 
Netherlands, the ATP in Denmark, and the other ATP in Sweden. 
  1 
The four countries emphasized strong fund governance structures, independence from 
government (with one notable exception), and public accountability and transparency. 
The public pension funds have been given clear commercial mandates to invest their 
resources efficiently to maximize investment returns while assuming a prudent level of 
risk. All four funds have a long investment horizon and have adequate resources to justify 
the creation of the new investment policy framework.  
 
Institutional Structure and Fund Governance: New separate state entities with their 
own boards of directors have been created in three of the four countries (Canada, Ireland 
and New Zealand). The boards of directors are responsible for formulating the investment 
policies of the funds, setting the strategic asset allocations, and supervising management. 
All three entities have small boards of experts rather than representatives of stakeholders 
to ensure greater effectiveness. Directors are appointed for fixed terms that are staggered 
to ensure continuity and can only be removed for just cause. The boards have adopted 
corporate governance and conflict of interest guidelines and have set up audit committees 
to ensure the effectiveness of internal control systems.  
 
In Norway, the new public fund has not been set up as an independent legal entity but as 
a government account with the central bank. Responsibility for managing the fund is 
vested in the Ministry of Finance, which makes all strategic decisions, formulates 
investment policy objectives, and sets the strategic asset allocation and benchmarks. As a 
result, the Norwegian fund does not enjoy formal independence from government. 
However, there are fiscal rules that limit use of the fund for short-term purposes, while 
the strategic asset allocation is subject to parliamentary approval.  
 
Public accountability of the four funds is buttressed by regular independent reviews of 
their performance as well as special examinations that may be commissioned by the 
government. All the funds are required to submit reports to the government and give 
evidence to parliamentary committees. 
 
Executive Management: Two of the funds, the CPPIB and the NZSF, have appointed 
internal chief executives who are responsible for managing the funds. In Ireland, the 
National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA) was appointed as the first executive 
manager for a period of 10 years. These three funds started their operations with small 
executive teams, mainly because the plan was for them to engage in passive indexed 
management and outsource active asset management to external specialists. 
 
In Norway, Norges Bank (the central bank of Norway) was selected as the operational 
manager of the public fund. The Bank is supervised by the Ministry. It created a special 
unit, Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM), to manage the assets of the fund.  
 
All four funds have placed special emphasis on monitoring and controlling both financial 
and operational risks. They have installed comprehensive information systems and 
developed detailed control procedures. They have all separated investment decision 
making from back-office operations, including record keeping, settlement, and 
  2performance measurement. They have each installed sophisticated systems to measure 
the performance of external asset managers. 
 
Investment Policy Objectives and Strategic Asset Allocation: In Canada, Ireland and 
New Zealand, the formulation of investment policy and the determination of strategic 
asset allocation are the responsibility of the boards of directors of the three funds. In 
contrast, in Norway this responsibility is vested in the Ministry of Finance. All funds 
have relied on external advisers for setting their first strategic asset allocation policies. 
Asset allocation strategies have been subject to regular reviews and revisions, entailing 
significant shifts in emphasis and orientation.  
 
The asset allocation strategies have reflected their long investment horizon and their 
operation as final wealth maximization units, free for a long period of time from the 
requirement to match assets and liabilities. They have been based on the historical level 
and volatility of returns on eligible instruments, but they have also been influenced by the 
perceived level of risk tolerance of their stakeholders.  
 
All the funds started by emphasizing passive management through external asset 
managers. However, this concept was relatively quickly expanded to include active 
management, the use of customized indexing to limit excessive exposure to index-
dominating companies and permit investments in smaller companies. This implied the 
development of internal management capabilities, first in passive management and 
progressively also in active management. Except for Norway, the approach was later 
expanded further to encompass investments in several alternative asset classes, including 
private equity, real estate and infrastructure projects as well as emerging markets. In the 
case of Canada, this has even included the taking of principal positions in individual 
corporations and participating actively in cooperation with private equity funds in hostile 
takeovers of leading entities in the domestic and international markets (principal 
investing). It also included the development of short-term trading capabilities. In all 
cases, investments in hedge funds and derivative instruments have also been authorized.  
 
These developments are a far cry from the original idea of passive investment in indexed 
instruments and the concept of public pension funds as ‘managers of managers’. The 
departure from that ideal has been justified by the need to enhance the investment 
performance of the fund. In the case of Canada, it has been argued that the new approach 
is necessary to obviate the need for a future increase in contributions or a reduction in 
benefits.  
 
This evolution of the strategic asset allocations of the four public pension funds has 
reflected the growing trend over the past decade or so among large university endowment 
funds, charitable foundations, and corporate pension funds to diversify out of investments 
in listed equities and bonds and seek higher returns in alternative asset classes, including 
private equity, real estate, hedge funds, and emerging markets. However, some aspects of 
this approach should raise policy concerns, with regard to asset valuation and exposure to 
managerial and ‘principal investing’ risks. 
 
  3Implementation of Investment Strategy: Implementation of the investment strategy is 
the responsibility of executive management. However, the decision regarding the relative 
reliance on passive and active management and the use of internal and external managers 
as well as the selection of external managers require board approval. Executive 
management is fully responsible for monitoring the performance of both internal and 
external managers and for reporting to the board. Executive management also plays an 
important advisory role and is often the driving force for important changes in investment 
strategy.  
 
Implementation of investment strategy involved the selection and appointment of global 
custodians, transition managers and external asset managers. In all cases, clear technical 
criteria were established for the selection of external service providers and a transparent 
process was utilized to ensure objectivity and avoidance of conflicts of interest. Global 
custodians were selected to secure the legal segregation and safe custody of assets and to 
facilitate a more efficient monitoring of the performance of external asset managers. 
Transition managers were retained to assist in investing large amounts of cash in 
domestic and foreign markets with minimal market impact. 
 
The number of retained external managers and the number of mandates has increased 
dramatically over time in all cases following the expansion of investments in private 
equity, real estate and infrastructure projects. Initially external managers were 
specializing in passive indexing but over time the emphasis has shifted to asset managers 
specializing in particular sectors, regions, or strategies.  
 
Investment Performance: All four pension funds have achieved positive investment 
results with excess returns over their respective benchmarks. However, equity returns 
have been adversely affected by the bursting of the high tech bubble in 2000 and the fall 
in equity prices in 2001 and 2002. Operating expenses have generally been low, although 
the growing emphasis on alternative asset classes has implied a significant increase with 
the passage of time. 
 
In Conclusion: In conclusion, despite the clear and significant departure from the 
original concept of external passive management, the experience of the four public funds 
has been positive. Governance and public accountability are strong in all countries. Their 
example has already been followed in several other OECD countries and is likely to be 
copied in a growing number of developing countries where public pension funds continue 
to play an important role. However, care needs to be taken to ensure that the more active 
approach to management and the emphasis on alternative asset classes do not cause a 
derailment of the fundamental objective of these funds, which is to help finance the 
anticipated large increase in public pension outlays over the next 20 to 50 years. As the 
investment horizon of these funds becomes shorter, asset allocation strategies would need 
to be adjusted to favor more liquid instruments that are easier to value.  
 




Public pension funds operate in many countries with very small reserves, covering 
pension payments for up to one year ahead. However, there is also a large number of both 
high income and developing countries where public pension schemes are partially funded 
and have accumulated significant reserves.  
 
In general, public pension funds have the potential to benefit from low operating costs 
because they enjoy economies of scale and avoid large marketing costs. But this 
important advantage is often dissipated by a poor record on investment performance, 
caused by a weak governance structure, lack of independence from government 
interference, and a low level of transparency and public accountability. 
 
Historically, public pension funds were managed poorly in most countries. They were 
forced to invest in government bonds and housing loans at low nominal interest rates, 
while investments in foreign assets were prohibited. In countries that suffered from high 
inflation, real investment returns were negative, while even in countries where nominal 
interest rates exceeded inflation, the returns on public pension reserves were well below 
equity market returns and well below the returns achieved by private pension funds.
2     
 
Recognizing the poor track record of public pension funds and the need to build pension 
reserves to meet the growing demographic pressures on public pension schemes, several 
OECD countries have in recent years revamped the governance structure and investment 
management of their public pension funds or have created new funds that have benefited 
from a strong governance structure, independence from government, and a high level of 
transparency and public accountability. 
 
This paper reviews the experience of four such OECD countries: Norway, Canada, 
Ireland and New Zealand. The paper is divided into 5 chapters. Chapters 2 to 5 discuss in 
some detail the experience of public pension funds in each of these four countries, 
reflecting the order in which they were set up. This first chapter provides an overview 
and summary of findings. After a brief synopsis of the past record of the investment 
performance of public pension funds, the chapter discusses the creation of new public 
pension funds, and then reviews their structure and performance in terms of their 
objectives, funding sources, institutional structure and fund governance, executive 
management, formulation of investment policy objectives and determination of strategic 
asset allocation, implementation of investment strategy and, last but by no means least, 
investment performance. The chapter ends with some concluding remarks and a brief 
summary of the main lessons for both high income and developing countries that may 
wish to create similarly organized public pension funds. 
                                                 
2 The poor performance of public pension funds has been documented in many studies. For a summary 
overview, see World Bank (1994), while for more detailed studies of public pension fund governance and 
performance see Mitchell and Hsin (1997), Iglesias and Palacios (2000), Useem and Mitchell (2000), Hess 
and Impavido (2004), and  Impavido (2002 and 2007). 
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1.2  Past Record of Investment Performance of Public Pension Funds 
 
The past record of the investment performance of public sector pension funds ranged 
from mediocre to disastrous and was far poorer than the record of private pension funds. 
Public pension funds that achieved a mediocre level of performance included, among 
others, the ATP (Allmänna TilläggsPensionen) fund in Sweden for the period before the 
early 1990s, the Social Security Corporation (SSC) of Jordan, the National Pensions Fund 
(NPF) of Mauritius and the Fiji National Provident Fund (FNPF). These funds 
underperformed financial markets because they invested heavily in marketable 
government bonds and did not benefit from the higher returns that were available on 
corporate equities and bonds or foreign assets. Their record was mediocre rather than 
disastrous since government bonds in these countries paid a positive rate of interest in 
real terms.  
 
The Swedish ATP underperformed financial markets in the period before financial 
liberalization in Sweden in the early 1990s as a result of a requirement to invest a large 
part of its resources in bonds issued by mortgage credit institutions at below market 
levels. This was part of government policy to support the development of the housing 
market but it did affect the returns of ATP. Over the past 15 years or so ATP has enjoyed 
considerable investment policy autonomy and has diversified heavily into domestic and 
foreign equities.   
 
In contrast, social security institutions in several Latin American countries in the 1970s 
and 1980s as well as in sub-Saharan African countries suffered heavy losses in their 
holdings of government bonds and housing loans, mainly because these instruments paid 
fixed nominal rates of interest at a time when inflation spiraled out of control and they 
also suffered from high levels of non-repayment (World Bank 1994, Iglesias and Palacios 
2000). Social security institutions in Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Peru and Venezuela in Latin America effectively lost all their reserves in highly 
inflationary times. The same fate was met by national provident funds in Ghana, Kenya, 
Nigeria, Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia in Africa. 
 
Historically, there have been some notable exceptions to the generally poor investment 
record of public pension funds. In the US, the best known examples are CALPERS, the 
fund that covers employees of local government in California, and the Thrift Savings 
Plan (TSP), which covers employees of the federal government. CALPERS is a defined 
benefit plan, while TSP is a defined contribution plan, but they have both adopted 
sophisticated and market-based investment policies.
3 
 
In Canada, the Caisse de Dépôt et Placement du Québec (CDPQ) has operated since its 
inception in the mid-1960s as the investment manager of the reserves of the provincial 
pension plan. It has also managed other public funds originating from various sources. 
                                                 
3 The TSP offers to participating employees a range of indexed funds that can be selected directly or as part 
of lifecycle funds. Investment fees are less than 2 basis points over all funds, while total operating costs, 
including the investment fees, are less than 6 basis points. 
  6The CDPQ has invested its assets in equities and debt securities in Quebec as well as 
outside Quebec and in overseas markets to the extent permitted by foreign exchange 
control rules. It has earned market-based investment returns. The Ontario Teachers 
Pension Plan (OTPP) is another Canadian public pension fund that has implemented 
well-diversified and efficient investment policies. OTPP used to be required to place all 
its reserves in non-marketable provincial government bonds but the restriction was 
removed in 1990 and since then OTPP has been a world leader in applying innovative 
techniques in asset management.  
 
In Europe, two public pension institutions that have long invested in marketable 
securities, including corporate equities and derivatives, are the ABP in the Netherlands 
and the ATP in Denmark. The ABP (Algemeen Burgerlijk Pensioenfonds) is a defined 
benefit plan for Dutch civil servants, while the Danish ATP (Arbejdmarkedets 
TillaegsPension - Labor Market Supplementary Pension) is a mandatory defined-
contribution supplementary pension scheme covering all Danish workers.
4 Despite being 
in the public sector, these institutions, like their Canadian counterparts, have long played 
a leading role in adopting innovative investment policies and have had an enviable record 
of high operating efficiency and investment returns. 
 
1.3  The Record of Pension Institutions with ‘Notional’ Reserves 
 
There are also public pension funds in several countries that have been required to place 
all their accumulated reserves in non-marketable government securities and have earned 
an administered rate of return. This practice has effectively transformed these institutions 
from ‘partially funded’ into completely ‘pay-as-you-go’ schemes, relying on future 
contributions and government tax revenues for the payment of pensions.  At least, if they 
hold marketable government securities, they can start a diversification program out of 
government bonds into corporate or even foreign securities.
5 When they hold ‘non-
marketable’ debt they must first replace it with marketable instruments and this will 
depend on the ability of the government to recognize this debt.   
 
Notable examples of this practice include the United States, Cyprus and Egypt.  In the 
United States, the Social Security Trust Fund has accumulated reserves exceeding 2 
trillion US dollars and representing more than 15 percent of GDP. The rate of 
remuneration has equaled the average yield of US government securities. In Cyprus, the 
Social Insurance Fund (SIF) has accumulated reserves corresponding to 36 percent of 
GDP, while the administered rate of interest has been set equal to 50 basis points below 
the Lombard rate, i.e. the rate at which the central bank lends to commercial banks. The 
                                                 
4 The Danish ATP fund is a long-established public pension fund that has recently modernized its 
investment framework. Vittas (2007) discusses briefly the investment policies of ATP, the evolution of its 
contributions and benefits, and its risk-sharing arrangements. 
5 This option is available to the Fiji National Provident Fund, which has assets equivalent to 65 percent of 
GDP and invests heavily in government bonds. However, its ability to diversify out of government bonds 
into other domestic securities or foreign assets is heavily constrained by the adverse impact that such action 
is likely to have on government finances and foreign exchange reserves. This implies that even holding 
marketable government securities may result, under some circumstances, in transforming pension fund 
assets into ‘notional’ reserves.  
  7SIF rate has been half way between the interest rate of 13-week Treasury bills and the 
yield on 10-year government bonds.  
 
In Egypt, the social security institutions have accumulated reserves between 30 and 50 
percent of GDP over the past two decades.  The administered rate of interest was initially 
fixed at a low level. As a result of high and volatile inflation, the institutions ‘earned’ a 
negative real rate of return of minus 11.7 percent between 1981 and 1989 (World Bank 
1994:128).  During the 1990s, the nominal rate of interest was raised to market levels 
and, with inflation falling to single digits, the social security institutions ‘earned’ positive 
annual real rates of return of more than 5 percent.
6 The problem in Egypt was that the 
deficit was then transferred to the National Investment Bank, which had advanced the 
funds to public projects and institutions of various types and had never earned the high 
returns that were required to be able to sustain the very high rate of interest it was 
crediting to the balances of the Social Security Institutions. The Egyptian authorities 
recognized in the end the non-existence of this ‘notional’ fund and decided in 2005 to 
implement over the ensuing years a radical systemic reform of the pension system. 
 
When public pension funds are required to place all their reserves in non-tradable 
government securities, the question of designing an efficient investment policy 
framework does not arise. The administered rate of return may (and often does) become a 
bone of contention but all other aspects of sound investment policy from adopting a 
strategic asset allocation to ensuring the safe custody of assets become moot.     
 
In the terms of the ensuing discussion on fund governance, the main weakness of funds 
like the SSTF in the US, the SIF in Cyprus or the social security institutions in Egypt has 
been the failure to ensure the legal segregation of their accumulated assets from the rest 
of the government budget. Three important policy questions arise when the social 
security funds are invested in non-tradable government debt (see box). However, for the 
purpose of this paper, it suffices to note that since the reserves are then ‘notional’, there is 
no need for the creation of an investment policy framework. 
 
                                                 
6 Robalino (2005:150-152) documents the rise in the rate of interest paid by the NIB in the second half of 
the 1990s and beyond.   
  8Box 1: Are Social Security Reserves ‘Notional’ or ‘Real’? 
Three important questions arise when the reserves of public pension funds are entirely or predominantly 
invested in government debt, whether in tradable or non-tradable form. What is the nature of the reserves? 
What is the nature of the flow of administered income? And, what is the rationale for setting payroll 
contributions at a rate that is significantly higher than the level required for financing current benefit 
payments? 
 
The answers to these questions depend on whether the public pension fund is part of general government or 
not. As regards the nature of the reserves, if the pension fund is part of general government, then its 
holdings of government debt are excluded from the definition of public debt since they are consolidated in 
the general government accounts. The reserves are therefore ‘notional’ and only represent an accounting 
entry: they cannot be used to finance the expenses of the fund. In fact, the government will need to increase 
its borrowing (or raise taxes) to meet any cashflow needs of the fund, making it functionally equivalent to a 
'pay-as-you-go' pension scheme. In contrast, when the public pension fund is established as a public entity 
outside general government, its holdings of government securities are counted as part of public debt and the 
reserves are ‘real’. Of course, being ‘real’ does not mean that such reserves can be readily realized to meet 
fund requirements – this depends on whether the securities are tradable and the liquidity of the secondary 
market on which they are traded.  
 
As regards the second question, income on the reserves is an internal accounting entry that cancels out in 
the consolidated general government accounts if the public pension fund is part of general government,. 
The level of the income does not affect the liquidity position of the institution unless the government 
intends and is able to create at some point in the future a segregated fund with effective reserves.  In such a 
case, the level of the administered rate would determine the size of the reserves and the transfer of 
resources
7 that would be required. But if the government is subject to fiscal constraints, the liquidity of the 
public pension fund would rely on current transfers from the budget. If the public pension fund is 
established outside general government, interest on its holdings of public debt will count as interest 
expenditure on the consolidated general government accounts.   
  
The answer to the third question is more contentious. If a high payroll tax is not linked to the immediate 
creation of an ‘effective’ reserve that is totally segregated from the government budget and is invested in 
marketable assets, the imposition of a high payroll tax is a regressive form of taxation that is a burden on 
low and middle income workers and weakens the degree of progressivity of personal income taxation. The 
underlying rationale is political rather than financial. 
 
1.4  Creation and Objectives of New Public Pension Funds 
 
Faced with growing financial pressures arising from changing demographics, several 
countries around the world decided in the past 15 years or so to modernize existing 
pension funds or to create new public pension funds with substantial reserves to help 
finance the rising cost of public pensions. Japan, Korea and Sweden have taken steps to 
remove or relax existing restrictions on the investment policies of their public pension 
funds. Other countries that have long operated completely unfunded or very lightly 
funded public pension schemes have created new public pension funds. Recent initiatives 
have been taken in such diverse countries as Australia, Canada, France, Ireland, New 
Zealand and Norway. 
 
These public pension funds joined the ranks of some pre-existing public pension funds 
and several government investment institutions that have been created in Arab oil-
                                                 
7 For instance, the Stability and Growth Pact of the European Union places limits on annual fiscal deficits 
and net levels of government debt on EU countries that participate in the Euro zone. 
  9exporting countries, such as Abu Dhabi, Bahrain, Dubai, Kuwait, Qatar and Saudi 
Arabia, as well as in China, Russia and Singapore. They are therefore part of a broader 
international trend. This paper focuses on the experience of recently created public 
pension funds in four OECD countries: Norway, Canada, Ireland and New Zealand. All 
created new funds, transferred reserves, committed to make annual contributions, and 
promoted a modern framework for efficient investment performance.
8 
 
Norway was the first of these countries to establish a new public fund. It created the 
Government Petroleum Fund in 1990 in order to invest in overseas markets the part of oil 
revenues (net of oil-related investments) that the authorities decided to save for the 
benefit of future generations. The Petroleum Fund was not initially formally set up as a 
pension fund although it was from the start expected to play an important part in meeting 
future demands on state pension expenditures. But in January 2006, the link was formally 
recognized and the Government Petroleum Fund was officially renamed the Government 
Pension Fund - Global (GPFG), reflecting the global orientation of its investments. There 
is also a Government Pension Fund - Norway, which manages the domestic, and much 
smaller, assets of the National Insurance Fund. 
 
Norway followed the precedent created by Kuwait in the late 1970s, when it established 
the Kuwait Investment Office (KIO) with a remit to invest in overseas markets its fast 
accumulating foreign exchange reserves. In Norway the creation of the Petroleum Fund 
was motivated by the decision to preserve assets for future generations and avoid the 
Dutch disease effects that would likely ensue from immediate spending of the oil wealth. 
In some sense, Norway also followed the example of Singapore, which was able to 
accumulate large foreign exchange reserves in the 1970s as a result of the success of its 
export-led economic policies. The Singaporean authorities decided in the late 1970s to 
create the Government of Singapore Investment Corporation (GSIC) with the objective to 
diversify the investment of foreign reserves away from holding low-yielding US treasury 
bills and into high-return global equities as well as direct investment projects in various 
parts of the world. 
 
A fundamental difference between the Norwegian fund and those of Kuwait and 
Singapore relates to transparency and public accountability. While the operations of KIO 
and GSIC have suffered from severe opacity, the Norwegian fund is required to operate 
with a very high level of transparency and accountability. The Ministry of Finance 
reports to Parliament on the performance of the fund. In addition, Norges Bank, which is 
responsible for managing the fund, holds press conferences every quarter on investment 
results and posts on its website comprehensive reports on its performance.  
 
The creation of new public pension funds in the other three countries (Canada, Ireland 
and New Zealand) was specifically linked to the need to finance the anticipated large rise 
in pension outlays over the next 20 to 50 years. The Canada Pension Plan Investment 
                                                 
8 The analysis of the experience of the four pension funds is based on the annual reports produced by the 
four institutions (Norges Bank and NBIM 1999-2006, CPPIB 1999-2007, NPRF 2001-2006 and NZSF 
2003-2006) as well as various presentations by government officials (Kjaer 2004, Maher 2004, 
MacNaughton 2004, and McCulloch and Frances 2004). 
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prevent the insolvency of the CPP in 2015. A major change was the acceleration in the 
projected increase in the contribution rate from 6 percent in 1997 to 9.9 percent in 2002. 
This was expected to generate significant reserves and the CPPIB was established to 
ensure their efficient management. The CPPIB objective is to accumulate reserves equal 
to 20 percent or more of the actuarial pension liabilities of the CPP.  
 
In Ireland, the National Pensions Reserve Fund (NPRF) was created in 2000 to manage 
assets to meet the growing financial pressures of anticipated adverse demographic 
developments. The fund is designed to underpin the long-term sustainability of existing 
pension arrangements by accumulating reserves that would cover about one-third of the 
cost of public pensions (social welfare and public service) between 2025 and 2055 and 
possibly beyond. 
 
The New Zealand Superannuation Fund (NZSF) was established in October 2001 with 
the aim of partially funding the universal public pension that is paid to all old-age persons 
residing in New Zealand. The accumulation of the fund and its use during the payout 
phase will offset the steep increase in the cost of the universal pension, particularly after 
2020. The fund will thus smooth out the financial burden on the budget from the impact 
of demographic aging on the universal pension scheme. 
 
In three of these countries (Ireland, New Zealand and Norway), the level of public debt is 
very low, ranging between 12 and 20 percent of GDP. As a result, the authorities did not 
face a difficult policy dilemma in deciding to create a new public pension fund. Creating 
a fund and investing in global assets was likely to earn a higher rate of return than the 
cost of public debt. In contrast, Canada has a higher level of public debt, amounting to 35 
percent of GDP for federal government and another 25 percent of the provincial 
governments. The new fund was created to forestall the financial insolvency of the CPP. 
It is to be funded by the projected annual surpluses of the CPP, following the substantial 
increase in the contribution rate.  
  
However, all four pension funds have similar objectives. They all aim to invest their 
resources efficiently to maximize investment returns while assuming a prudent level of 
risk. All four funds have a long investment horizon. No withdrawals from these funds are 
expected for at least the first 20 years of their existence and perhaps much longer. This 
has major implications for the formulation of investment policy objectives and the setting 
of their asset allocation strategies. 
 
1.5 Funding  Sources 
 
The sources of funding are different in each of these countries. Norway transfers to the 
GPFG the net oil revenues that are saved for future generations. Although the Fund was 
created in 1990, no transfers took place in the first half of the 1990s because of low net 
oil income and large oil-related investments. The first transfer was made in May 1996. 
Since then, annual transfers have been quite sizable, exceeding on several occasions 10 
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related investments declined.  
 
Norway adopted in 2001 the so-called 4-percent fiscal rule. This limits the non-oil 
government budget deficit to 4 percent of the value of the accumulated fund, i.e. the 
expected real rate of return on fund assets. Taking into account the investment income 
generated by its assets, the size of the fund has grown at a rapid pace both in absolute 
terms and as proportion of GDP. The fund accumulated assets equal to 1,784 billion 
NOK in 2006, equivalent to about 285 billion USD (216 billion EUR) or 83 percent of 
GDP. The assets of the Government Pension Fund - Norway amounted in 2006 to 107 
billion NOK or 5 percent of GDP. Thus, in total, the Government Pension Fund had 
assets corresponding to 88 percent of GDP. 
 
The CPPIB was created in December 1997 but received the first transfer of funds in 
March 1999. The Board receives all cash flows that are not required by the CPP to pay 
current pensions and also retains all investment income generated from its operations. 
The annual operating surplus of the CPP grew substantially following the increase in 
contribution rates. The CPPIB also received the proceeds of redeemed federal and 
provincial government bonds that the CPP used to hold before 1998. The total assets of 
the CPP amounted to 117 billion CAD in March 2007. They rose from 4.5 percent of 
GDP in 2000 to 8.1 percent in 2007.  
 
The Irish NPRF is funded with annual government contributions equal to 1 percent of 
GNP, possibly supplemented by privatization proceeds. The NPRF was created in 2000 
but the first transfer of funds was made in April 2001. It included 6.5 billion EUR that 
had been accumulated in a temporary holding fund since 1999, pending the creation of 
the NPRF. This included the proceeds from the privatization of the State's Telecom 
company. Total assets reached 18.9 billion EUR at the end of 2006, corresponding to 
12.6 percent of GNP (or 10.8 percent of GDP).  
 
The NZSF is funded by annual government contributions. These vary from year to year 
and depend on a formula that calculates annually the required contribution for meeting 
the financial objective of the fund. The annual contribution reached 1.5 percent of GDP 
in 2006, when total assets amounted to 6.3 percent of GDP. The first transfer of 
contributions was made in October 2003, two years after the creation of the NZSF. The 
first transfer included funds that had been set aside in fiscal year 2002 and 2003 in 
anticipation of the creation of the fund. 
 
With the exception of the Norwegian fund which is already very large but is required to 
invest in overseas markets, all the other funds are small relative to the size of the national 
economy. Their assets range between 6 and 11 percent of GDP. Although their assets are 
expected to grow significantly, the pension funds will not become dominant players in 
the local financial systems, which comprise large banks, insurance companies, and other 
public and private pension funds. This has important implications for avoiding excessive 
concentration of financial power in public institutions and for minimizing pressures from 
local interests for investment policies that are biased toward the home markets.      
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1.6  Institutional Structure and Fund Governance 
 
New separate state entities with their own boards of directors have been created in three 
of the four countries (Canada, Ireland and New Zealand). The boards of directors 
(commissioners in the case of Ireland, guardians in the case of New Zealand) are 
responsible for formulating the investment policies of the funds, setting the strategic asset 
allocations, and supervising management. All three entities have small boards of experts 
rather than representatives of stakeholders: 6 in New Zealand, 7 in Ireland, and 12 in 
Canada. This structure contributes to greater effectiveness. 
 
In Canada and New Zealand, a two-stage process was followed in appointing directors. 
First, an independent nominating committee was created. This consisted of private sector 
executives with relevant experience in New Zealand, while the Canadian nominating 
committee included both business executives and government officials, with a private 
sector executive in the chair. The nominating committees were required to identify and 
recommend individuals with the requisite expertise. The governments then made 
appointments from the short lists prepared by the nominating committees. In Ireland, the 
government is required to appoint as commissioners individuals with appropriate 
professional expertise. 
 
The relevant acts in the three countries do not specify director qualifications in precise 
terms. In Ireland, commissioners must have acquired substantial expertise and experience 
at a senior level in a broad range of areas, including investment or international business 
management, finance or economics, law, actuarial practice, accountancy and auditing, 
civil service, trade union representation, pension industry, and consumer protection. In 
Canada, a sufficient number of directors must have proven financial ability or relevant 
work experience. In New Zealand, board members must have substantial experience, 
training and expertise in the management of financial investments. These specifications 
ensure that directors are experienced professionals. They do not, however, ensure that 
they have adequate knowledge of modern financial instruments and strategies whose 
complexity grows at a very rapid pace. However, this is an issue that affects the boards of 
directors of all types of entities, private corporations as well as public sector bodies, not 
just public pension funds. 
 
Directors are appointed for fixed terms that are staggered to ensure continuity. Directors 
can only be removed for just cause. The first appointments of some directors were for 
shorter terms to enable the staggering of board service. The boards of directors operate 
with strong governance structures. Their operations are based on two important 
principles: independence from government and other interests, especially in making 
investment decisions; and full public accountability.
9 They all have been given 
commercial mandates subject to the ‘prudent person’ rule.  
 
                                                 
9 In New Zealand, the minister of finance has the power under the law to issue directions to the governing 
board of the public pension fund. However, these must be in writing, must be presented to Parliament, and 
must be published in the official gazette. No direction has been issued up to now. 
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governance and conflict of interest guidelines and have set up Audit Committees to 
ensure the effectiveness of internal control systems. They have appointed auditors and 
global custodians and adopted appropriate asset segregation and valuation rules. They 
have also made considerable use of external advisers on a wide variety of topics, ranging 
from advice on asset allocation strategies to the selection of external asset managers and 
the adoption of sophisticated information systems.   
 
In Norway, the fund has not been set up as an independent legal entity but as a 
government account with the central bank. The fund itself has no rights or obligations 
against private sector entities or public authorities and may not institute, or be subject to, 
legal proceedings. Responsibility for managing the fund is vested in the Ministry of 
Finance, which makes all strategic decisions, formulates investment policy objectives, 
and sets the strategic asset allocation and benchmarks. However, an Advisory Council on 
Investment Strategy has also been appointed. The voting rights of the fund are exercised 
by its operational manager. 
 
The Norwegian GPFG does not enjoy formal independence from government. Apart from 
the 4-percent fiscal rule, no other special measures have been adopted to insulate the fund 
from political interference. The fiscal rule limiting the use of accumulated balances is set 
by the government and must be approved by Parliament. The strategic asset allocation is 
also subject to parliamentary approval. But, as already noted above, the fund is required 
to operate with a very high level of transparency and public accountability.  Moreover, 
the various features of strong corporate governance, such as asset segregation, valuation 
rules and effective internal controls, are all observed at the level of the operational 
manager (see below).  
 
Public accountability of the four funds is buttressed by regular independent reviews of 
their performance as well as special examinations that may be commissioned by the 
ministers of finance. All the funds are required to submit reports to the government and 
give evidence to parliamentary committees. 
 
All four funds have endorsed the Principles of Responsible Investing that have been 
sponsored by the United Nations. The aim of the principles is to integrate consideration 
of environmental, social and governance issues into investment decision-making and 
ownership practices and thereby improve long-term returns. In addition, all four funds 
have adopted clear guidelines on the proper exercise of their rights as shareholders in 
local and foreign corporations. In general, the funds favor the development of corporate 
governance policies that promote transparency and respect the rights of shareholders. 
 
1.7 Executive  Management 
 
Two of the funds, the CPPIB and the NZSF, have appointed internal chief executives 
who are responsible for managing the funds. In Canada, board directors cannot be 
appointed officers of the CPPIB and officers cannot serve as directors. The positions of 
Board Chair and Chief Executive Officer are separate. The Chair is responsible for 
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applies in New Zealand. 
 
In Ireland, the NPRF Commission has the right to appoint the manager of the fund in 
consultation and with the consent of the Minister of Finance. But the National Treasury 
Management Agency (NTMA) was appointed under the National Pensions Reserve Fund 
Act, 2000 as the first executive manager of the fund for a period of 10 years.  
 
The Chief Executive of the NTMA is an ex officio member of the Commission. The 
NTMA is responsible for managing the public debt of Ireland. Debt management 
agencies are created with the objective of minimizing the total cost of public debt subject 
to a prudent level of risk. It is thus a natural choice to manage the assets of the NPRF 
with the objective of maximizing the investment return subject to a prudent level of risk. 
Since the NPRF is not allowed to invest in Irish government securities, there is no direct 
conflict of interest between these major functions of the NTMA.
10 
 
The three funds started their operations with small executive teams, mainly because the 
plan was to engage in passive indexed management and outsource asset management to 
external specialists. The CPPIB started with a staff of 15, and the NTMA and NZSF with 
less than 10. However, the CPPIB has undergone an extensive change in its investment 
orientation and has engaged not only in internal active management but also in principal 
investing and short-term trading. As a result, the total number of staff expanded 
substantially each year and reached 271 in March 2007. The NTMA employed 17 
officers to cover the operations of the NPRF in 2006 and the NZSF had 15 people in June 
2006, but was planning to increase its staff to 25 in the current year.   
 
In Norway, the Ministry of Finance selected Norges Bank (the central bank of Norway) 
as the operational manager of the GPFG. The assignment is open-ended and is subject to 
a one-year period of notice of termination by either party. The Ministry supervises the 
operations of the bank and uses independent consultants to evaluate its performance. 
Norges Bank offers investment advice to the Ministry on most aspects of the operations 
of the fund but especially on investment policies and asset allocation strategies. 
 
Norges Bank created a special unit, Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM), to 
manage the assets of the fund. Prior to the creation of this specialized unit, the Market 
Operations Department was dealing with the management of foreign exchange reserves. 
However, the bank felt that the investment experience gained from managing the foreign 
exchange reserves did not provide an adequate foundation for efficient management of 
the much larger and longer-term resources of the GPFG. NBIM was created by 
transferring some employees from other departments of the Bank, but most staff was 
hired through external recruitment. NBIM had 41 staff at the end of 1998. This grew to 
79 by 1999 and reached 128 staff at the end of 2006. Some employees are based in the 
                                                 
10 When investments in infrastructure projects are considered, proper Chinese walls are put in place 
between the managers of the NPRF and the managers of infrastructure projects. 




All four funds have placed special emphasis on monitoring and controlling both financial 
(market) and operational risks. They have installed comprehensive information systems 
and developed detailed control procedures. They have all separated investment decision 
making from back-office operations, including record keeping, settlement, and 
performance measurement. They have also installed sophisticated systems to measure the 
performance of external asset managers. 
 
1.8  Investment Policy Objectives and Strategic Asset Allocation  
 
In Canada, Ireland and New Zealand, the formulation of investment policy and the 
determination of strategic asset allocation are the responsibility of the boards of directors 
of the three funds. In contrast, in Norway this responsibility is vested in the Ministry of 
Finance. All funds have relied on external advisers for setting their first strategic asset 
allocation policies. Asset allocation strategies have been subject to regular reviews and 
revisions, entailing significant shifts in emphasis and orientation.  
 
The asset allocation strategies have reflected their long investment horizon and their 
operation as final wealth maximization units, free for a long period of time from the 
requirement to match assets and liabilities. They have been based on the historical level 
and volatility of returns on eligible instruments, but they have also been influenced by the 
perceived level of risk tolerance of their stakeholders.  
 
The last factor may explain why the Norwegian fund was initially entirely invested in 
fixed-income securities and only in 1997, after two parliamentary debates, the ministry 
decided to change the strategic asset allocation to 60 percent bonds and 40 percent 
equities. It may also explain why despite having the largest relative size of all the funds 
under review and also the longest investment horizon, the GPFG continues to use a much 
more conservative asset allocation than the other three funds.  
 
However, the Norwegian authorities announced in late 2006 their intention to increase 
the equity allocation to 60 percent and to expand the universe of eligible investments by 
including small listed companies and possibly also real estate and infrastructure 
investments. The asset allocation excludes investments in Norwegian equities because the 
local market represents less than 0.2 percent of the global equity market and the fund 
                                                 
11 NBIM observes all the requirements of good corporate governance. It established from the start proper 
procedures to separate investment decisions from back-office operations, including record keeping, 
settlement, and risk and return measurement. The assets of the GFPG are segregated from the other assets 
of the central bank and are reported separately in the bank's balance sheet as a government account. Proper 
custodial arrangements have been put in place for the safe custody of assets, securities are marked to 
market on a continuous basis, and both risk and return measurements are closely monitored and assessed. 
An internal audit department has been created and is required to report to the Audit Committee of the 
executive board of Norges Bank. 
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12 The much smaller Government Pension Fund -
Norway invests in local bonds and equities. 
 
The other three funds have followed very similar approaches in setting and subsequently 
revising their asset allocation strategies. The CPPIB took into account the inherited bond 
portfolio of the CPP and thus its initial allocation favored equity investments. In Ireland 
and New Zealand, the asset allocation strategies, which were prepared with advice from 
the same firm of international investment consultants, targeted a broad allocation of 80 
percent equities (growth assets) and 20 percent bonds (defensive assets).     
 
The Irish fund prohibits investment in Irish government bonds. Its investments in Irish 
equities are less than 1 percent of total assets, in line with the share of the Irish stock 
market in Eurozone equities, which are perceived as the relevant domestic market. In 
New Zealand, local equities account for 7.5 percent of total assets and local bonds for an 
additional 10 percent. The NZSF has resisted pressures to raise its allocation to local 
equities to 30 percent or more, but its current allocation exceeds the relative importance 
of the local market in global equities. The CPPIB has the largest share of assets allocated 
to local equities and bonds. Even though this share has been declining, it still amounted 
to 55 percent of total assets in 2006. However, as in other funds, the use of derivatives 
products, including especially traded options, may cause a substantial change in the 
relative exposure of the CPPIB to Canadian and foreign assets. 
 
All three funds started by emphasizing passive management through external asset 
managers. However, this concept was relatively quickly expanded to allow active 
management, use of customized indexing to limit excessive exposure to index-
dominating companies and allow investments in smaller companies, and development of 
internal management capabilities, first in passive management and progressively also in 
active management. The approach was later expanded further to encompass investments 
in several alternative asset classes, including private equity, real estate and infrastructure 
projects as well as emerging markets.  
 
In the case of Canada, this has even included the taking of principal positions in 
individual corporations and participating actively in cooperation with private equity funds 
in hostile takeovers of leading entities in the domestic and international markets 
(principal investing). It also included the development of short-term trading capabilities. 
The CPPIB has also established several subsidiaries specializing in private equity 
investments in emerging countries and plays a management role in large infrastructure 
projects in several developing countries. In New Zealand the current strategy covers 
internal management of investments in forestry and timber operations.  
 
In all cases, investments in hedge funds and derivative instruments have also been 
authorized. Derivatives, including equity index swaps and futures, are used to manage 
risk, enhance returns, and provide liquidity, but they change drastically the exposure of 
                                                 
12 GFPG investments are subject to strict ethical guidelines that aim to ensure that the companies in which 
the fund invests its resources have good corporate governance structures, are well managed, respect human 
rights, and protect the environment. 
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is caused by the use of some derivative products, especially options, makes the discussion 
of asset and liability structures less meaningful. However, a full presentation of risk 
exposures is lacking from all publicly available reports and this weakens the claims about 
complete transparency.  
 
These developments are a far cry from the original idea of passive investment in indexed 
instruments and the concept of public pension funds as ‘managers of managers’. The 
departure from that ideal has been justified by the need to enhance the investment 
performance of the fund. In the case of Canada, it has been argued that the new approach 
is necessary to obviate the need for a future increase in contributions or a reduction in 
benefits.  
 
This evolution of the strategic asset allocations of the four public pension funds has 
reflected the growing trend over the past decade or so among large university endowment 
funds, charitable foundations, and corporate pension funds to diversify out of investments 
in listed equities and bonds and seek higher returns in alternative asset classes, including 
private equity, real estate, hedge funds, and emerging markets (Bernstein 2007:205). 
Alternative asset classes may promise higher expected returns. Although their expected 
volatility is also likely to be higher, the low correlation of their returns with those of 
listed equities and bonds implies at most a small increase in the volatility of total 
portfolio returns. In addition, some of these assets are marked-to-market at infrequent 
intervals, which would imply a smaller recorded volatility, even if the underlying 
volatility were much greater. 
 
Thus, the departure of the investment policies of public sector funds from the romantic 
idea of passive external management follows a widespread trend among large 
institutional investors. Nevertheless, some aspects of the new approach should raise 
policy concerns. First is the risk (identified by Warren Buffett, the well-known investor) 
that ‘mark-to-model’ valuations may over time mutate to ‘mark-to-myth’ valuations. The 
recent experience with CDOs based on sub-prime mortgages lends support to this 
concern. Second, the more extreme forms of alternative investments, such as 
management of infrastructure projects, engaging in principal investing, and participation 
in hostile takeovers, expose public pension funds to risks for which they are unlikely to 
be well prepared and for which they are unlikely to have the requisite skills. It would be 
more consistent with the long-term objective of public pension funds to seek to maximize 
returns with a prudent level of risk if they limited their involvement in alternative asset 
classes to those that avoid ‘principal investor’ risks and rely on robust valuation models. 
 
1.9   Implementation of Investment Strategy  
 
Implementation of the investment strategy is the responsibility of executive management. 
However, the decision regarding the relative reliance on passive and active management 
and the use of internal and external managers as well as the selection of external 
managers require board approval. Executive management is fully responsible for 
monitoring the performance of both internal and external managers and for reporting to 
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driving force for important changes in investment strategy. This seems to be more 
pronounced in Canada where a generous system of executive compensation is used.  
 
Implementation of investment strategy in the four public pension funds involved the 
selection and appointment of global custodians, transition managers and external asset 
managers. In all cases, clear technical criteria were established for the selection of 
external service providers and a transparent process was utilized to ensure objectivity and 
avoidance of conflicts of interest. Global custodians were selected to secure the legal 
segregation and safe custody of assets and to facilitate a more efficient monitoring of the 
performance of external asset managers. Use of global custodians simplifies the 
assignment and termination of mandates to different managers. Custodians also provide 
supplementary services in transaction settlement, collection of income, claiming of tax 
refunds, cash sweeps, fund accounting and reporting, and securities lending. Transition 
managers were retained to assist in investing large amounts of cash in domestic and 
foreign markets with minimal market impact. 
 
The number of retained external managers and the number of mandates has increased 
dramatically over time in all cases following the expansion of investments in private 
equity, real estate and infrastructure projects. Initially external managers were 
specializing in passive indexing but over time the emphasis has shifted to asset managers 
specializing in particular sectors, regions, or strategies. The CPPIB maintains 
relationships with well over 70 private investment, real estate and infrastructure groups. 
The Norwegian fund also has a large number of external managers and mandates, while 
for the remaining two funds, the number of managers ranges between 15 and 25.   
 
The appointment of external managers requires close monitoring of their performance 
and adoption of well-constructed benchmarks to facilitate the measurement and 
attribution of performance and risk to different managers. All funds have adopted 
sophisticated systems of reporting and measurement of risks and returns that complement 
the work of custodians. Formal review meetings of external asset managers are held at 
regular intervals and these reviews inform the board decision to renew or terminate 
particular mandates. 
 
1.10 Investment  Performance  
 
All four pension funds have achieved positive investment results with excess returns over 
their respective benchmarks. However, equity returns have been adversely affected by the 
bursting of the high tech bubble in 2000 and the fall in equity prices in 2001 and 2002.  
 
In Norway the average annual return over the whole period since 1997 equaled 6.5 
percent. The return on equities for the period since 1998 reached 7 percent, while bonds 
produced over the same period a lower return of 5.4 percent. NBIM reported an excess 
return that averaged 48 basis points over the period 1998-2006. Operating costs are low 
and compare favorably with those of other large international pension funds. Overall 
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the other costs amounted to 7 basis points. 
 
In Canada the average rate of return on all CPP assets for the period 2000-2007 was 8.2 
percent. Annual data on excess returns over the benchmark portfolio show that very large 
excess returns of the order of 8 percentage points were realized in 2001. This is explained 
by the decision to reduce exposure to Nortel Networks that accounted at the time for 35 
percent of the Toronto market. This underscored the benefits of using customized 
indexing. The operating costs of the CPPIB at 11 basis points appear low at first sight and 
comparable to those of the most efficient pension fund management institutions around 
the world, like the TSP in the US, ATP in Denmark, or the NBIM in Norway. In reality, 
however, total operating costs are higher than the costs of these other institutions. This is 
because the reported costs exclude external management fees and trading commissions, 
which amounted to around 20 basis points in the last couple of years. Adding external 
management fees and trading commissions to total operating costs would raise their level 
to between 28 and 42 basis points over the last 5 years.
13 
  
In Ireland investment returns fluctuated considerably from year to year, reflecting the 
high volatility of equity market returns in the early years of the new millennium. The 
fund achieved a substantial excess return over its benchmark in 2001 and 2002 mainly 
because of a deliberate delay in implementing its asset allocation strategy. The 
annualized average rate of return over the whole period 2001-2006 amounted to 6.5 
percent. Operating expenses, including the expenses of NTMA, increased over time and 
amounted to 21 basis points in 2006. The combined Commission and NTMA expenses 
ranged between 6 and 7 basis points and are comparable to management expenses of 
other large pension funds. However, external management fees exceeded 15 basis points.   
 
In New Zealand fund performance, net of investment management expenses, averaged 
14.5 percent since its inception. The strong results are attributed to the fact that the fund 
avoided the unsettled markets at the start of the new millennium. Mainly because of the 
young age of the fund and its small size, operating expenses relative to average total 
assets are high by comparison to other large public pension funds. Operating expenses 
rose to 71 basis points in 2006, up from 28 points in 2004. Investment management fees 
account for the lion's share of expenses.  
 
1.11 Concluding  Remarks 
 
The newly created public pension funds of Canada, Ireland and New Zealand share many 
common characteristics. They all have small professional boards, are independent of 
government, and operate with a very high level of transparency and public accountability. 
They all have regular sources of funding as well as long investment horizons and they 
have been charged with a commercial mandate to seek high investment returns with a 
prudent level of risk. The boards of directors are responsible for setting the strategic asset 
allocation and executive management for implementing the chosen strategy. 
                                                 
13 It should be noted that reported operating costs of most pension funds do not include investment 
management fees charged indirectly for participations in investment funds.  
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The GPFG of Norway shares all these features, except that it is not independent of 
government. Its asset allocation is determined by the Ministry of Finance and approved 
by Parliament. However, the adoption of the 4-pecent fiscal rule, whereby only 4 percent 
of the total value of the fund can be used in any one year to finance the structural deficit 
of the government, has placed a strict limit on the use of the fund for current political 
objectives. A practical aspect of the different composition of the board is that, despite 
being the largest and having the longest investment horizon, the Norwegian fund has 
persistently adopted the most conservative asset allocation of all four funds.  
 
Two of the public pension funds (CPPIB and NZSF) have appointed internal chief 
executives. Management of the Irish fund has been assigned to the National Treasury 
Management Agency (NTMA), which also manages the public debt of Ireland.  In 
Norway, executive management of the fund has been entrusted to Norges Bank. The 
latter created a special investment management unit, NBIM, which has discharged its 
duties as manager in the same professional way as the executive managers of the other 
three funds.    
 
All four funds were initially set up to operate with a small complement of skilled staff, 
build diversified portfolios of global equities and bonds, and effectively act as managers 
of managers, focusing on passive indexed management through external managers. This 
romantic idea did not last long. Passive indexed management was soon complemented 
with enhanced indexing, which allows transactions that respond to special pricing 
opportunities, and customized indexing, which limits exposure to index-dominating 
companies and also allows investments in smaller local companies that are not included 
in the main market index. Then passive management was brought in-house, followed 
after a while with developing internal active management. The role of external managers 
was gradually limited to implementing active overlay programs, seeking excess returns 
through performance-based contracts. 
 
A major shift in investment strategy occurred with decisions to expand allocations to 
private equity, real estate and other alternative assets. These investments involve non-
passive management, although they rely for the most part on external managers. Three of 
the funds have already authorized substantial increases in such allocations, while in 
Norway the case for investments in alternative assets is under evaluation. The Canadian 
fund has also pursued principal investing, management of infrastructure projects, and 
short-term trading. For its part, the New Zealand fund has become involved in operating 
large timber investments.  
 
Alternative asset classes promise high returns and their valuation is not exposed to the 
high volatility of securities traded on public markets. But they are a far cry from the 
original perception of passive indexed management through external managers. An 
important implication of these changes has been a large expansion of staff, especially by 
the Canadian and Norwegian funds. 
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spectacular. This is explained by the poor returns of global equity markets in the first few 
years of the new millennium following the bursting of the high tech bubble in early 2000. 
The New Zealand fund, which started operations after the rebounding of equity markets, 
has reported much higher investment returns than the other three funds. Excess returns 
relative to their benchmarks have been realized by all funds. However, the growing 
emphasis on alternative asset classes, which are not ‘marked-to-market’ but are rather 
‘marked-to-model’, weakens the relevance of the benchmarks.   
 
In conclusion, despite the clear and significant departure from the original concept of 
external passive management, the experience of the four public funds has been positive. 
Governance and public accountability are strong in all countries. Their example has 
already been followed in several other OECD countries and is likely to be copied in a 
growing number of developing countries where public pension funds continue to play an 
important role. However, care needs to be taken to ensure that the more active approach 
to management and the emphasis on alternative asset classes do not cause a derailment of 
the fundamental objective of these funds, which is to help finance the anticipated large 
increase in public pension outlays over the next 20 to 50 years. As the investment horizon 
of these funds becomes shorter, asset allocation strategies would need to be adjusted to 
favor more liquid instruments that are easier to value. 
 
1.12  Lessons for Other Countries 
 
At the risk of some repetition and oversimplification we summarize below the main 
lessons for other countries. These are presented as a checklist of policy issues. 
 
Preconditions: Public pension funds should be established only if they can rely on 
regular transfers of funds and can operate with long investment horizons. Care should be 
taken to avoid a large level of public debt; in other words, countries that have high levels 
of public debt should give priority to a reduction in their debt level before they start 
transferring resources to a public pension fund. The size of the public pension fund 
should not be too large relative to the national economy and the local financial markets. 
Global diversification should be encouraged. Countries, which already have public 
pension funds and seek to modernize their investment operations, should also address 
questions regarding their relative size and should consider changing other parameters to 
ensure that their public pension fund does not acquire a dominant position in the local 
economy and financial market. Needless to add, the ability to enforce high standards of 
fund governance is crucial to the success of the new approach to public pension fund 
management.       
 
Objective: The public pension fund should have a clear and unequivocal commercial 
mandate. The mandate should be to seek to maximize long-term investment returns, 
subject to a prudent level of risk, and after taking fully into account the structure of its 
liabilities and the length of its investment horizon. 
 
  22Legal Status: The public pension fund should ideally be established as a separate legal 
entity and not as a general government agency. This would imply that it should not be 
treated as a budgetary unit and its assets should be legally segregated from the general 
government. 
 
Institutional Independence: The public pension fund should be independent from 
government and should be insulated from political interference. However, the fund 
should be required to operate with a very high level of public transparency and should be 
subject to full public accountability to Parliament and its main stakeholders. 
 
Funding Sources: The public pension fund should have access to stable and long-term 
sources of funding. Ideally, funding should be in the form of regular transfers either from 
the surplus of worker contributions over pension benefits or directly from the budget. 
Funding could be supplemented with ad hoc transfers from privatization revenues or 
other financial transactions. 
 
Board of Directors: The public pension fund should have a small board of experts (less 
than 10) rather than representatives of stakeholders or ex-officio appointees. There should 
be a sufficient number of directors with adequate expertise and experience on financial 
matters, investment policies and portfolio management. To ensure the appointment of 
high-caliber professionals, a nominating committee should be created to identify a short 
list of candidates from which the Minister of Finance would make director appointments. 
To promote continuity, director appointments should be staggered. Appointments should 
be for fixed terms and could be renewed for a stated number of terms (2 or 3), while 
removals should only be permitted for just cause. The process of director removal should 
be clearly stipulated in the relevant act. 
 
Board Committees: The Board of Directors should create several key committees with 
clear terms of reference and areas of responsibility. These should include an audit 
committee, a governance committee, and an investment committee. Outside experts could 
be recruited to serve on these committees along side board directors. 
 
Governance Policies: The Board of Directors should establish clear guidelines on 
corporate governance, including rules on conflicts of interest and ethical conduct by 
directors and senior managers of the fund. It should also establish clear policies on its 
role in promoting good practices of corporate governance in investee companies. These 
should emphasize transparency and public disclosure and full respect of shareholder 
rights. 
 
Internal Controls: The Audit Committee of the Board should establish clear policies on 
internal control systems and should especially institute a separation of investment 
decision making from back-office operations, such as confirmation and settlement of 
transactions, record keeping, and measurement and attribution of investment performance 
and risk. 
 
  23Investment Policy and Strategic Asset Allocation: The Investment Committee could 
undertake the fundamental analysis of options but the Board of Directors should be 
responsible for approving the investment policy and asset allocation strategy.  This 
should be based on the investment horizon of the fund and should take into account the 
expected returns and risk levels of different types of instruments. The structure of 
liabilities should also be taken into account. Initially, passive management of investments 
in listed equities and bonds could be favored but over time consideration could also be 
given to active management and investment in unlisted securities, including alternative 
asset classes, such as private equity, real estate and infrastructure projects. Even with 
passive management, customized and enhanced indexing should be adopted at an early 
stage to mitigate risks and increase returns.
14 In contrast, principal investing and 
assumption of managerial responsibilities in individual companies or projects should be 
avoided unless there are strong reasons and well-documented safeguards in favor of such 
initiatives. The strategic asset allocation should be subject to regular reviews and should 
be modified in the light of experience and changing market conditions. 
 
Executive Management: The Board of Directors should have responsibility for 
appointing a Chief Executive Officer and approving the selection of top management, 
including a chief accountant, an internal auditor, and an actuary (if necessary). 
Alternatively, it could opt for appointing an external agency for the executive 
management of the fund. An external management agency should specialize in managing 
long-term investment assets and should employ staff with long experience and relevant 
skills in the markets in which the assets of the fund are to be invested. It should also 
recruit staff that is experienced in selecting, managing and monitoring the performance of 
external asset managers. The management agency should also develop sophisticated 
information systems to track the performance of asset managers.   
 
Selection of External Service Providers: The Board of Directors should be responsible 
for the selection and termination of various providers of external services, including a 
global custodian, a transition manager (if necessary), external asset managers, external 
auditors, and external consultants. Clear and detailed selection criteria should be adopted, 
while the performance of external asset managers should be monitored and evaluated by 
reference to well-constructed benchmarks that properly reflect the level of risk of 
particular assets.  The Board of Directors should opt for using specialist external 
consultants in setting the asset allocation strategy and determining the selection criteria 
for other service providers. The appointment of a reputable global custodian is a 
particularly important decision because global custodians play a very critical role in the 
segregation and safekeeping of assets and in monitoring the performance of external asset 
managers.  
 
Transparency and Public Disclosure:  The Board should abide by a very high level of 
transparency and public disclosure.  It should publish audited annual financial statements, 
quarterly performance reviews as well as internal and external governance and other audit 
                                                 
14 Customized indexing would limit investments in index-dominating companies and would also permit 
investments in smaller companies that are not included in the market index. Enhanced indexing would 
allow the exploitation of special pricing opportunities. 
  24reviews. It should publish its investment policy objectives and all its corporate and 
internal control guidelines. Its chairperson should be required to report periodically to 
relevant Parliamentary committees.  




Norway created the Government Petroleum Fund in 1990. The Norwegian authorities 
decided to save most of net oil revenues and invest it overseas. This would both preserve 
assets for future generations and avoid the Dutch disease effects that would likely ensue 
from immediate spending of the oil wealth (Kjaer 2004). 
 
The Petroleum Fund was not initially formally set up as a pension fund although it was 
from the start expected to play an important part in meeting future demands on state 
pension expenditures. In January 2006, the link was formally recognized and the 
Government Petroleum Fund was officially renamed the Government Pension Fund - 
Global. This reflects the global orientation of its investments. There is also a Government 
Pension Fund - Norway, which manages the domestic, and much smaller, assets of the 
National Insurance Fund. The total assets of the Government Pension Fund amounted in 
2006 to 1,891 billion NOK or 88 percent of GDP. The global fund has the lion's share 
with 83 percent of GDP, while the domestic fund has assets equal to 5 percent of GDP.  
 
Norway did not face a policy dilemma between creating a new fund and paying off public 
debt.  Total domestic government debt amounted in 2006 to 239 billion NOK or about 12 
percent of GDP (Norges Bank 2006). The low level of public debt supports the allocation 
of net oil revenues to the Government Pension Fund. If the public debt had been much 
higher, oil revenues would presumably have been used to lower the debt to a more 
moderate level. The long-term strategy of government borrowing is to maintain a yield 
curve with particular emphasis on liquid benchmark issues of 5 and 10 year maturities. 
Nearly half (46 percent) of public debt is held by foreign investors, while life insurance 
companies and private pension funds own about 31 percent. 
 
2.2 Funding  Sources  
 
No transfers to the global fund took place in the first half of the 1990s because of low net 
oil income and large oil-related investments (IMF 2007). The first transfer, which 
equaled the surplus on central government accounts in 1995, was made in May 1996. 
Since then, annual transfers have been quite sizable, exceeding on several occasions 10 
percent of GDP, as both oil production and the price of oil increased rapidly, while oil-
related investments declined (Table 2.1).   
 
The so-called 4-percent fiscal rule was adopted in 2001. This limits the non-oil 
government budget deficit to 4 percent of the value of the accumulated fund, i.e. the 
expected real rate of return on fund assets.
 15 It is interesting to note that the 4-percent 
                                                 
15 This rule maintains the real value of Fund assets. However, because of the long-term growth of GDP, the 
Fund will become insignificant in relation to national income in the very long run. Alternative rules include 
a non-oil public deficit that is equal either to a given percentage of GDP or to the long-term rate of return 
on Fund assets minus the projected rate of economic growth. See IMF (2007) for a discussion of the long-
term implications of these issues.   
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time (IMF 2007).   
 
Taking into account the investment income generated by its assets, the size of the fund 
has grown at a rapid pace both in absolute terms and as proportion of GDP. The fund 
accumulated assets equal to 1,784 billion NOK in 2006, equivalent to about 285 billion 
USD (216 billion EUR) or 83 percent of GDP. The assets of the Government Pension 
Fund - Norway amounted in 2006 to 107 billion NOK or 5 percent of GDP. 
 
Table 2.1: Annual Transfers and Total Assets of GPF, 2000-2006 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
         
Transfers  (NOK  bn)  149.8 251.2 125.4 103.9 138.2 220.3 288.3 
Percent  of  GDP  10.2  16.5 8.3 6.6 8.0  11.6  13.4 
         
Assets  (NOK  bn)  386.5 613.7 609.0 845.3  1016.4  1399.0  1783.7 
Percent  of  GDP  26.3 40.2 40.1 53.6 59.2 73.5 83.0 
Source: NBIM and IFS 
 
2.3  Institutional Structure and Fund Governance 
 
Norway did not establish the GPFG as an independent legal entity.
16 The fund itself has 
no rights or obligations against private sector entities or public authorities and may not 
institute, or be subject to, legal proceedings (Government Pension Fund Act, 2005, 
chapter 1, section 6). Responsibility for managing the fund is vested in the Ministry of 
Finance, which makes all strategic decisions, formulates investment policy objectives, 
and sets the strategic asset allocation and benchmarks.  
 
Apart from the 4-percent fiscal rule, no other special measures have been adopted to 
insulate the fund from political interference. The fiscal rule limiting the use of 
accumulated balances is set by the government and must be approved by Parliament. The 
strategic asset allocation is also subject to parliamentary approval.   
 
The Ministry selected Norges Bank as the operational manager of the fund. The 
assignment is open-ended and is subject to a one-year period of notice of termination by 
either party. The Ministry supervises the operations of the bank and uses independent 
consultants to evaluate its performance. Norges Bank exercises the voting rights of the 
fund. 
 
The fund is required to operate with a very high level of transparency and public 
accountability. The Ministry reports to Parliament, through national budget documents, 
on the performance of the fund and on the Bank's management. Norges Bank holds press 
conferences every quarter to explain its results and compare them against the benchmarks 
set by the Ministry. It posts on its website comprehensive reports on the performance of 
                                                 
16 A decision was taken in 2007 to organize the National Insurance Fund, which manages the Government 
Pension Fund - Norway, as a separate legal entity. Thus, the operational managers of the two funds will be 
legal entities, but the funds themselves will not.  
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bank's contribution as operational manager. 
 
Norges Bank decided in 1998 to create a new unit, Norges Bank Investment Management 
(NBIM), for managing the assets of the GPFG as well as those of the Government 
Petroleum Insurance Fund and the part of official foreign exchange reserves that were not 
needed for liquidity purposes. Prior to the creation of this specialized unit, the Market 
Operations Department was dealing with the management of foreign exchange reserves. 
But the bank felt that the investment experience gained from managing the foreign 
exchange reserves did not provide an adequate foundation for efficient management of 
the much larger and longer-term resources of the GPFG. 
 
NBIM was created by transferring some staff from the existing department but also 
through extensive external recruitment. NBIM had 41 staff at the end of 1998. This grew 
to 79 by 1999 and continued to expand and reached 128 staff at the end of 2006. Some of 
the staff is based in the London and New York offices of NBIM. Remuneration is on a 
separate scale and reflects international competitive levels. 
 
NBIM established from the start proper procedures to separate investment decisions from 
back-office operations, including recordkeeping, settlement, and risk and return 
measurement. Its executive director reports directly to the Governor of the central bank, 
while an internal audit system was also created. This was upgraded in 2006 following a 
decision of the Executive Board of Norges Bank to create an Audit Committee and to 
require the internal audit department to report directly to the Audit Committee and 
through it to the Board.      
 
The assets of the GFPG are segregated from the other assets of the central bank and are 
reported separately in the bank's balance sheet as a government account. Proper custodial 
arrangements have been put in place for the safe custody of assets, securities are marked 
to market on a continuous basis, and both risk and return measurements are closely 
monitored and assessed. 
 
2.4  Investment Policy Objectives and Strategic Asset Allocation 
 
The formulation of investment policy objectives and the determination of strategic asset 
allocation rest with the Ministry of Finance. An Advisory Council on Investment Strategy 
has been appointed, while Norges Bank also offers technical advice to the Ministry on 
investment policy matters. However, the Ministry retains responsibility for making 
proposals to Parliament, which debates changes in investment policy and strategic asset 
allocation. 
 
Initially the fund was entirely invested in fixed-income securities. In 1997, after two 
Parliamentary debates, the Ministry decided to change the strategic asset allocation to 60 
percent bonds and 40 percent equities. Norges Bank advised the Ministry of Finance on 
the risks and expected returns of equity markets (Kjaer 2004). At that time, it was also 
decided to exclude investments in Norwegian equities because the local market 
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for the local market. It was also pointed out that the Norwegian authorities had other 
funds that could be used to provide state capital to support the local economy. 
 
The decision to allocate only 40 percent of the fund in global equities could be 
questioned given the very long investment horizon of the GPFG and the persistence of 
the equity premium in global markets over a period of more than 100 years (Dimson et al 
2002). But risk tolerance was rather low in Norway at that time. Because of the poor 
performance of global equity markets at the turn of the millennium, the fund suffered 
large losses in 2001 and 2002 that were aggravated further by the relative appreciation of 
the Norwegian currency. 
 
The investment guidelines issued by the Ministry, and retained in the Government 
Pension Fund Act of 2005 (chapter 2, section 4), set the equity share between 30 and 50 
percent of the portfolio and fixed income instruments between 50 and 70 percent. The 
regional allocation is divided into 3 parts, Europe, Americas and Africa, and Asia and 
Oceania. The range for equities is: Europe 40-60 percent, Americas and Africa 25-45 
percent, and Asia and Oceania 5-25 percent. The range for bonds is slightly different: 
Europe 50-70 percent, Americas and Africa 25-45 percent, and Asia and Oceania 0-15 
percent. Several emerging market countries were included in the detailed list of approved 
currencies and markets in the 2005 Act. These ranged from Brazil, Chile and Mexico in 
Latin America to South Africa in Africa and China, India, Indonesia, Philippines, and 
Thailand in Asia. 
 
In 2006 the Ministry made some important changes in its investment guidelines. The 
maximum ownership stake in individual companies was raised from 3 to 5 percent, the 
minimum credit rating requirement of a BBB investment grade for corporate bonds was 
removed, and investments in commodity-based contracts and in funds were permitted.    
 
Following a review of the fund's investment strategy and taking into account the strong 
performance of equity markets in the last four years, the authorities announced in the 
2007 White Paper on the Government Pension Fund their intention to increase the equity 
allocation to 60 percent as well as to expand the universe of eligible investments by 
including small listed companies in the benchmark portfolio (MOF 2007). Both of these 
changes will be implemented over several years to minimize transaction costs. In 
addition, the authorities indicated that they are evaluating the possible inclusion of real 
estate and infrastructure investments as a new asset class. Another proposed change 
concerns the delegation to Norges Bank of the decision to select the currencies and equity 
markets in which the fund can be invested.  
 
Norges Bank in an earlier submission to the Ministry argued in favor of increasing the 
equity allocation and noted that the higher variability in annual returns would be justified 
by the expected increase in their level. Anticipating growing challenges in investment 
management Norges Bank established in 2006 an advisory board composed of four 
internationally respected experts with extensive experience from large investment 
management institutions.    
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The investment policy objectives specify that in its investments the fund should observe 
ethical guidelines established by the Ministry of Finance. A five-member Advisory 
Council on Ethics has been created to advise the Ministry on these issues. The Ministry 
maintains a negative list of companies that, following a recommendation from the 
Advisory Council on Ethics, are excluded on ethical grounds from the investment 
universe of the fund. The ethical guidelines aim to ensure that the companies in which the 
fund invests its resources have good corporate governance structures, are well managed, 
respect human rights, and protect the environment.  
  
2.5  Implementation of Investment Strategy 
 
Norges Bank is responsible for implementing the investment strategy which, as noted 
above, is undertaken by NBIM. The Ministry of Finance establishes and makes public the 
portfolio benchmarks.
17 Academic observers and journalists are able to calculate the 
return of the benchmarks each quarter and thus to compare the performance of NBIM as 
investment manager. 
  
NBIM is expected to pursue passive investment management, tracking the benchmarks 
stipulated by the Ministry, but some active management is allowed subject to a limit of 
1.5 percent in expected tracking error. Initially, NBIM hired external managers for 
passive equity index management and conducted in-house passive indexed fixed income 
management. Over time, however, NBIM has moved away from this approach, 
undertaking enhanced indexing internally for both equities and bonds and hiring 
specialist managers for more active management in both types of instruments. NBIM has 
not yet been authorized to invest in real estate, infrastructure and private equity, although 
as mentioned above and following spreading international practice, Norges Bank has 
suggested to the Ministry the need to evaluate the case for investing in alternative assets.  
 
NBIM pursues the achievement of excess return by means of a large number of 
independent individual decisions. Investment decisions as well as selection of external 
managers are assigned to individual staff members. The choice between external and 
internal management is governed by expected profitability and specialized expertise. The 
main criteria for the selection of external managers are track record, access to relevant 
information, proven skill in building appropriate portfolios, and operational efficiency. 
 
About 80 percent of assets are managed internally, taking advantage of the economies of 
scale that are inherent in the fund's size, while 20 percent are awarded to external 
managers, mostly for specialized equity mandates (by geographic region or by industrial 
sector). However, external mandates account for about 50 percent of value at risk. Their 
contracts are based on performance fees and, mainly for this reason, external mandates 
account for over 60 percent of all costs. 
 
                                                 
17 For equity investments, this was stated in the 2005 Act (chapter 3, section 1.2) to consist of 50 percent 
FTSE All-World Europe; 35 percent FTSE All-World Americas/FTSE All-World Africa; and 15 percent 
FTSE All-World Asia Pacific. 
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increased steadily over time and reached 50 external managers with a total of 80 
mandates in 2006: 22 managers with 35 mandates in the fixed income segment and 28 
managers with 45 mandates in equities.  
 
Internal management is divided between enhanced indexing, which follows a passive 
approach but with some allowance for transactions that respond to special pricing 
opportunities, and active management, which involves both stock selection and market 
timing. NBIM also engages in securities lending to augment the income of the fund. It 
has lending agreements with several global banks. 
    
2.6 Investment  Performance 
 
Since the equity allocation has been allowed, the equity portion of the portfolio, including 
the small environmental fund, has fluctuated within a small range around 40 percent 
(Table 2.2).        
 
Table 2.2: Asset Allocation, 2000-2006 
percent  of  total  assets  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
         
Equities  39.5 40.9 37.9 42.7 41.0 41.6 40.7 
Fixed  Income  60.5 59.1 62.1 57.3 59.0 58.4 59.3 
Source: NBIM 
 
The investment return, measured in terms of the currency basket in which the various 
securities are held, amounted in 2006 to 7.9 percent. Over the whole period since 1997, 
the average return equaled 6.5 percent. The return on equities for the period 1998-2006 
reached 7 percent, while bonds produced a lower return of 5.4 percent over the same 
period. Investment returns calculated in terms of the local currency fluctuated more 
widely from year to year because of the relative appreciation or depreciation of the local 
currency but over the whole period the average return expressed in Norwegian crowns 
was 6.4 percent, almost identical to the return calculated in the currency basket.
18  
 
Equity returns suffered from the bursting of the high tech bubble in 2000 and the sharp 
market correction of the first few years of the new millennium, but benefited from the 
substantial rebounding of global equity markets in the past four years. Bond returns have 
been less volatile but have been lower on average (Table 2.3).      
    
Table 2.3: Asset Returns on Equities and Bonds, 2000-2006 
percent  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
         
Equities  -5.82  -14.58  -24.38 22.84 13.00 22.49 17.04 
Fixed  Income  8.41 5.04 9.90 5.26 6.10 3.82 1.93 
Total  Portfolio  2.50 -2.43 -4.69 12.59  8.94 11.09  7.92 
Source: NBIM 
                                                 
18 It is worth noting that the Government Pension Fund - Norway enjoyed a higher return (measured in 
NOK) of 11.7 percent in 2006 and an average return since 1997 of 7.1 percent (MOF 2007). 
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NBIM achieved an excess return that averaged 48 basis points over the period 1998-
2006. Over the 3-year period 2004-2006, internal management made a higher 
contribution to excess returns, after deducting operating costs, than external management 
(Table 2.4).  
 
Table 2.4: Annualized Contribution to Net Excess Returns, 2004-2006 
in basis points  External  Internal  Total 
Equities  13 18 31 
Fixed Income   3  14  17 
Total  16 32 48 
Source: NBIM 
 
The inferior contribution of external equity management was caused by a poor 
performance of external managers in the Japanese equity market in 2006. This is reflected 
in the negative contribution of external equity management in 2006. In earlier years, 
external equity management achieved a superior performance (Table 2.5).  
 
Table 2.5: Annualized Contribution to Excess Returns, 2002-2006 
in  basis  points  2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
      
Internal  Equities  1  6 11 20 31 
Internal  Bonds  9 18 17 20 13 
Internal  Total  10 24 28 40 44 
       
External  Equities  10 20 21 65  -32 
External  Bonds  5  15 4 5 3 
External  Total  15 35 25 70  -29 
       
Total Gross Excess Return  25  59  53  110  15 
Management  Costs  4 5 4 5 3 
Total  Net  Excess  Return  21 54 49  105 12 
Source: NBIM 
 
The operating costs of NBIM are low and compare favorably with those of other large 
international pension funds. Internal management costs declined over time and reached 
slightly less than 5 basis points of average internally-managed assets in 2006 (Table 2.6). 
In contrast, external management experienced a rising trend and its costs amounted to 
close to 30 basis points of average externally-managed assets in 2006.  
 
Overall operating costs increased slightly to 10 basis points. However, after deducting 
performance-based fees, the other costs fell from 7.9 basis points in 2002 to 7.3 in 2006. 
This is well within the target agreed by negotiation between the Ministry and the Bank. 
Norges Bank charges directly the Ministry for these costs. Performance-based fees are 
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in basis points  2002  2003  2004  2005  2006 
      
Internal Assets (% of total assets)  80  77  78  78  79 
External Assets (% of total assets)  20  23  22  22  21 
       
Internal Management Costs  7.0  6.2  5.1  4.9  4.8 
External Management Costs  17.1  24.4  29.4  31.1  28.3 
       
Internal Contribution to Costs  5.7  4.8  4.0  3.8  3.8 
External Contribution to Costs  3.3  5.6  6.5  6.8  6.0 
Total  Costs  9.0 10.4 10.5 10.6  9.8 
Performance  Based  Fees  1.1 1.2 2.6 2.7 2.5 
Costs without Performance Fees  7.9  9.2  7.9  7.9  7.3 
Source: NBIM 
 
Norges Bank participates in the database of operating costs of large pension funds that is 
compiled by the Canadian consulting firm, CEM Benchmarking Inc. This database 
includes cost performance data on over 250 pension funds. A peer group of large pension 
funds that has been selected by CEM from this database shows that NBIM has lower 
operating costs than the median fund from this peer group (Table 2.7).  
 
Table 2.7: Comparative Database of Operating Costs, 2003-2005 
in basis points  2003  2004  2005 
    
GPF – Global  10.4  10.5  10.6 
Peer Group – Median  13.1  12.0  13.4 
Source: NBIM 
 
2.7 Concluding  Remarks 
 
The Norwegian GPFG has been created to preserve oil wealth for future generations and 
help meet rising pension expenditures. The fund does not have a separate legal entity but 
is effectively a government account with the central bank.  
 
Decisions about investment policy objectives and strategic asset allocation are the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Finance, but must be approved by Parliament. Norges 
Bank, which has been selected as the operational manager of the fund, provides advice on 
investment policy. Asset allocation has been conservative, despite the long investment 
horizon. This has been influenced by the need for parliamentary debate and approval of 
the strategic asset allocation and has probably reflected a low level of risk tolerance.  
 
The fund is subject to a very high level of transparency and public accountability, but it is 
not completely insulated from political interference. However, the so-called 4-percent 
fiscal rule, which states that the annual structural budget deficit should not exceed 4 
percent of Fund assets, imposes some discipline on political pressures to increase public 
spending.  
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strategic asset allocation has been 60 percent bonds and 40 percent equities. Investments 
in Norwegian equities have been excluded. The government announced in late 2006 its 
intention to raise the equity allocation to 60 percent. Investments in alternative assets are 
under evaluation but have yet to be approved.  
 
The central bank created a new unit, Norges Bank Investment Management (NBIM), to 
manage the assets of the fund. NBIM maintains in its operations a clear separation of 
investment decisions from back-office operations. It aims to earn an excess return over 
the benchmark portfolios established by the Ministry and uses both internal and external 
managers. Initially, most investments were made through passive indexed management. 
External managers were used for global equities and internal managers for fixed income 
instruments. But over time greater emphasis has been placed on enhanced indexing and 
active management. This has involved a large expansion of staff.  
 
The lack of independence from government and the need for parliamentary debate and 
approval probably explain the clear conservatism in investment policy and the apparent 
timidity in investing in alternative asset classes. These asset classes (real estate and 
private equity) are currently favored by the ‘expert’ boards of similar funds in other 
OECD countries, although in some of them the tilt in favor of such assets may have gone 
too far. It is very difficult to define a golden rule in these matters. An increased allocation 
to equities seems fully justified given the long investment horizon of the fund. A large 
allocation to real estate and private equity could also be justified given the promise of 
much higher returns in the long run. However, a leading role in organizing mergers and 
acquisitions and corporate restructurings, in which some public pension funds in Canada 
have engaged in recent years, would veer too far away from the basic objectives of the 
fund.     
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The Canada Pension Plan Investment Board (CPPIB) was created in December 1997 
following a broad agreement between the federal government and the provinces that 
participate in the Canada Pension Plan. Its mandate is to maximize investment returns on 
the cash flows received from the Canada Pension Plan without incurring undue risk and 
having regard to the factors that may affect the funding of the CPP and its ability to meet 
its financial obligations on any given business day. 
 
The Province of Quebec did not join the CPP when it was first set up in 1966 and opted 
to create its own provincial pension system, the Quebec Pension Plan (QPP).
20  The 
Caisse de Dépôt et Placement du Québec (CDPQ) has been entrusted with managing the 
reserves of the QPP along with the reserves of numerous employment-based public sector 
pension plans. The CDPQ has invested accumulated assets in equities and debt securities 
in Quebec as well as outside Quebec and in overseas markets to the extent permitted by 
the foreign property rule.
21  
 
For its part, the CPP had accumulated prior to1998 a small amount of assets, which had 
been invested in 20-year non-marketable debt securities of the federal and participating 
provincial governments. A public pension fund that is entirely invested in non-marketable 
government securities is effectively a ‘notional’ fund. For all practical purposes it is the 
same as if the pension scheme operates on a ‘pay-as-you-go’ basis. The ‘notional’ fund 
that existed prior to the creation of the CPPIB amounted to 36.5 billion CAD or 4 percent 
of GDP. This was equal to 8 percent of actuarial pension liabilities. 
 
Faced with the growing financial pressures of demographic aging and a looming financial 
crisis for the CPP by 2015, the Canadian authorities took various steps in the mid-1990s. 
They decided to accelerate the projected increase in the contribution rate from 6 percent 
in 1997 to 9.9 percent in 2002. They also instituted various improvements in plan 
administration and they created the CPPIB to manage the reserve assets that were 
expected to grow rapidly (MacNaughton 2004). The intention of these changes was to 
increase the funding ratio of CPP from 8 to 20 percent or more and assure the long-term 
fiscal sustainability of the plan. 
 
The CPPIB followed the precedent set by the CDPQ in 1966 and the Ontario Teachers 
Pension Plan (OTPP) in 1990. Since its establishment, the CDPQ has invested its assets 
                                                 
19 Comments received from John Ilkiw and John Graham of the CPPIB are gratefully acknowledged. 
However, the usual disclaimer applies. 
20 A portability agreement between the CPP and QPP has ensured that workers moving between Quebec 
and the other provinces have been able to transfer their credits between the plans. 
21 The foreign property rule was removed in June 2005. 
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22 For its part, the OTPP used to invest all its assets in non-
marketable government bonds but it was authorized in 1990 to diversify its portfolio and 
has since developed an elaborate investment strategy that, like the CDPQ, includes 
investments in Canadian and foreign public equities as well as private equities and other 
alternative assets. 
 
3.2 Funding  Sources 
 
The CPPIB received the first transfer of funds in March 1999.  It receives all cash flows 
that are not required by the CPP to pay current pensions and also retains all investment 
income generated from its operations. The CPPIB also received the proceeds of redeemed 
federal and provincial government bonds.  
 
Under a 1996 agreement among provincial governments, each province had the option to 
roll over its existing bonds for one further 20-year term. Funds not rolled over were 
transferred to the Investment Board, unless they were needed by the CPP. Federal bonds, 
which amounted to 3.4 billion CAD in 1999, did not have the rollover option. The bond 
portfolio of CPP was managed by the Federal Department of Finance (FDF) until April 
2007 when the small amount of remaining bonds was transferred to the CPPIB.  
 
The total assets of the Plan and the Board grew rapidly in recent years, reflecting the 
increase in contribution rates and the higher investment returns achieved by the CPPIB 
(Table 3.1). The total assets of CPP rose from 44.5 billion CAD in 2000 to 117 billion 
CAD in March 2007. The fixed-income securities of CPP fell steadily during this period 
and were less than 1 billion CAD in 2007. In contrast, the assets managed by CPPIB 
expanded from 2.4 billion CAD in 2000 to 116 billion CAD in 2007. The total assets 
corresponded in March 2007 to 8.1 percent of 2006 GDP, up from 4.5 percent in 2000.  
 
Table 3.1: Total Assets of CPP and CPPIB, 2000-2007 
end  March  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
in  billion  CAD          
Total  Assets  of  CPPIB    2.4  7.2 14.3 17.5 32.8 58.6 88.6  115.9 
Bonds  with  FDF  42.1 41.5 39.3 38.1 37.7 22.7  9.4  0.7 
Total  Assets  of  CPP  44.5 48.7 53.6 55.6 70.5 81.3 98.0  116.6 
          
CPPIB  Assets  (%  GDP) 0.2 0.7 1.3 1.5 2.7 4.5 6.5 8.1 
CPP  Assets  (%  GDP)  4.5 4.5 4.8 4.8 5.8 6.3 7.2 8.1 
Source: CPPIB 
 
Public debt in Canada is much higher than in Ireland, New Zealand and Norway and does 
not allow the government to make an additional contribution to building the assets of 
CPP. Net federal public debt is estimated at 35 percent of GDP, while including the debt 
of provinces the total probably exceeds 60 percent of GDP.    
                                                 
22 The CDPQ operates under a dual mandate to both earn investment returns and promote economic 
development in Quebec, while the CPPIB has no public policy mandate. 
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3.3  Institutional Structure and Fund Governance 
 
The CPPIB has been established as an independent state institution with its own board of 
directors. This consists of 12 members appointed by the federal Minister of Finance in 
consultation with provincial finance ministers. It operates with a strong governance 
structure. This is based on two important principles: independence from government and 
other interests, especially in making investment decisions; and full public accountability. 
 
The CPPIB has a unique corporate status: it operates at arm's length from government at 
both the federal and provincial level, its assets are segregated from government assets, 
and its staff is not part of the public service. It is thus able to function as a professional 
investment manager in the private sector with strong public sector accountability.   
 
A two-stage process was followed in selecting and appointing the founding board of 
directors. First, a special nominating committee was created by the federal and provincial 
governments. This committee consisted of business executives and government officials 
representing each province, with a private sector executive in the chair, and was asked to 
identify and recommend individuals for board directorships. Second, the federal Minister 
of Finance, in consultation with provincial finance ministers, appointed directors from the 
nominating committee's list. The Chair was appointed in consultation with the provinces 
and directors. This process aimed to ensure that the board has extensive business, 
investment, financial and professional expertise, but also represents all regions of 
Canada.  
 
The same two-stage process is used for appointing new directors. Directors are appointed 
for three-year terms and can be re-appointed for two more terms. Directors can only be 
removed for just cause. Appointments are staggered to ensure continuity. 
  
Regarding the qualifications of directors, the act requires that the board includes a 
sufficient number of directors with proven financial ability or relevant work experience 
such that it will be able to effectively achieve its objectives. Thus, the act mandates a 
board of experts rather than a board of employer and worker representatives but does not 
specify the required level of financial knowledge and expertise. Given the rapid growth 
of financial innovation of recent years and the proliferation of highly complex products 
and strategies it is not clear that broadly-defined business and professional experience 
would equip directors with the necessary knowledge to assess accurately the prospects of 
investment initiatives brought to the attention of the board by senior management. 
However, this is an issue that affects all types of entities, private corporations as well as 
public sector bodies, not just public pension funds like the CPPIB.
23 
 
Board directors are required to act honestly and in good faith in the best interest of the 
Investment Board. As fiduciaries, they must exercise the care, diligence and skill that a 
reasonably prudent person would exercise in comparable circumstances. The directors are 
                                                 
23 The CPPIB has recognized these challenges and has attempted to address them through the 
implementation of a risk-based governance structure in 2006. 
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offices of the Board, appointing officers, and specifying their duties; appointing an 
internal and external independent auditor; formulating procedures to identify and resolve 
conflicts of interest; creating a code of conduct for directors, officers and employees; 
supervising management; and communicating with stakeholders.  
 
Under the CPPIB Act, board directors cannot be appointed officers of the Board and 
officers cannot serve as directors. The positions of Board Chair and Chief Executive 
Office are separate. The Chair is responsible for leading the Board of Directors and the 
CEO for leading management. The Board of Directors appoints the CEO. 
 
The board of directors has adopted corporate governance guidelines, a code of conduct 
for directors and employees, and conflict of interest guidelines developed with the 
assistance of an external advisor. A consulting firm was retained to advice on board 
compensation. It recommended fees based on the compensation for comparable public 
sector organizations. The board also adopted procedures for evaluating the performance 
of both board directors and senior management.  
 
Four board committees have been created. Two of these, the investment and audit 
committees, are required by the CPPIB Act. The investment committee is responsible for 
establishing investment policies, standards and procedures as well as reviewing and 
approving the annual investment plan and monitoring its effectiveness. It is also 
responsible for reviewing the investment risk management approach and approving the 
engagement of external fund managers and asset custodians. The audit committee 
oversees financial reporting, the external and internal audit, information systems, and 
internal control policies and practices. The human resources and compensation 
committee is responsible for compensation policy, the performance evaluation process 
for the CEO, and organizational structure. The governance committee is responsible for 
recommending governance policies, guidelines and procedures and monitoring 
compliance with the code of conduct and conflict of interest guidelines. According to 
CPPIB’s Code of Conduct any attempt by government to influence the investment 
decisions, hiring practices or procurement must be reported to, among others, the Chair or 
the CEO, who will take appropriate action. 
 
The board of directors appointed the first chief executive officer in September 1999. 
Initially, the CPPIB was managed by a small team of senior investment and business 
executives. A decision was taken to avoid building a large organization with specialized 
departments for particular investment classes, such as real estate and private equity. But 
with the passage of time, this decision was reversed. The size of staff increased 
substantially from 15 in 2001 to 271 in 2007. Most of the increase took place in the last 
three years, reflecting an accelerated asset growth, more activities undertaken in-house, 
and a substantially more complex investment policy.  
 
The CPPIB Act imposes rigorous public accountability, including a transparent 
investment policy, a detailed annual report that must be publicly available, audited 
financial statements, quarterly performance reports, and public meetings at least once 
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Finance can order a special audit at any time, while a special examination of the 
Investment Board's systems and practices must be undertaken at least once every six 
years. Finally, the triennial actuarial review of the CPP provides another opportunity for 
assessing the contribution of the Investment Board to the financial standing of the CPP. 
 
3.4  Investment Policy Objectives and Strategic Asset Allocation 
 
The board of directors is responsible for approving the investment policy of the CPPIB 
and the strategic asset allocation. It is required to consider factors that may affect the 
funding of the CPP and its ability to meet its long-term pension liabilities. The 
investment policy addresses the asset mix, asset diversification, expected investment 
returns, risk management and liquidity, and the use of derivative products. In setting the 
strategic asset allocation, the CPPIB is required to take into account the bond portfolio of 
the CPP, that at one time resided with the FDF. Senior management plays a key role in 
initiating regular reviews of asset allocation strategy and making recommendations to the 
board of directors for its approval. 
 
The asset allocation strategy has been influenced by two crucial federal regulations. The 
first has been the limit imposed on foreign investments by the foreign property rule. A 20 
percent limit applied in 1999 but this was raised to 25 percent in 2000 and 30 percent in 
2001, before being completely removed in June 2005. These limits applied to all 
Canadian pension funds and other tax-deferred retirement plans.  The CPPIB allocated 
about 30 percent of total assets in foreign equities in 2006 and raised this further to 40 
percent in 2007. Adding other foreign assets, the total foreign exposure reached 45 
percent in 2007, up from 36 percent a year earlier.  
 
The second regulation has concerned the right of provincial governments to roll over 
maturing bonds for another 20-year term. In 2001, the provinces were allowed to redeem 
their bonds earlier than their maturity dates and transfer the proceeds to the CPPIB. This 
contributed to an acceleration of the release of funds that had been locked into long-term 
non-tradable bonds. 
 
A major change occurred in 2004 when the CPPIB was given responsibility for cash 
management of the CPP, investing liquid funds in money market securities and releasing 
funds to CPP as needed for the payment of current benefits. A decision was also taken to 
transfer all bond holdings, even those that had been rolled over, to the CPPIB within a 
three-year period ending in April 2007. 
 
To offset the dominance of the CPP's fixed-income securities, the CPPIB initially 
adopted a policy of investing in equities 100 percent of its cash flows. It was originally 
required to adopt a passive management style and invest in stock index funds. But 
already in 2000 this restriction was relaxed and the CPPIB was allowed to invest up to 50 
percent in individual stocks. After reviewing its asset allocation strategy in 2001, 
investment management evolved from solely passive to partially active investing. This 
was motivated by a desire to reduce exposure to one company (Nortel Networks) that 
  39accounted at the time for 35 percent of the Toronto index (TSE 300). Private equity and 
real estate investments were undertaken in 2002 through participation in limited 
partnerships and pooled funds.  
 
In fiscal 2003, all passive management was brought in-house, while customized indexing 
was introduced. This allowed investments in small capitalization Canadian companies.  
In fiscal 2004 external managers were retained for an active overlay program. At the 
same time, it was decided to move from an investment model by geographic regions to a 
model based on global economic sectors. The diversification into private equity, venture 
capital opportunities and real estate investments that began in 2002 was gradually 
expanded. 
 
In fiscal 2006 a fundamental and detailed strategic review was undertaken by senior 
management with board participation at key stages. The board and management decided 
to design a portfolio to capture risk-adjusted returns in excess of passive market returns 
and to measure excess returns against a Reference Portfolio invested passively in 
traditional asset classes. This decision reflected the view that future passive investment 
returns would be insufficient to meet the requirements of the fund.  
 
The new Reference Portfolio is based on public indices and consists of 40 percent global 
equities, 25 percent Canadian equities, 25 percent fixed income, and 10 percent real 
return bonds. It replaced the customized benchmarks, the use of which was no longer 
needed following the removal of all restrictions on foreign investments.  
 
The new investment strategy extended the gradual transition from passive to active 
management and culminated in what amounts to a complete reversal of the early 
emphasis on passive investment. The new approach implied a significant expansion of 
investments in alternative asset classes, including real estate and private equity.  
 
The CPPIB is now actively seeking to expand its internal active management, engaging 
in both traditional value-added management and short-horizon trading strategies. In its 
private equity investments, it is not merely acting as a passive investor in private equity 
funds but is also involved as a principal investor alongside other fund managers. A 
prominent initiative in this area was its recent involvement in the takeover battle over 
Bell Canada between competing groups of institutional investors and private equity 
funds.  
 
The CPPIB is also acting as a principal investor in several other private equity 
investments, including in markets overseas. It intends to follow a similar approach in 
infrastructure projects, acquiring ownership rights in toll roads, airports, electrical 
transmission networks and water distribution systems, both as a passive investor in 
infrastructure funds and as a principal investor. Its involvement in real estate projects has 
also evolved into owning controlling stakes of between 50 to 80 percent in office 
buildings, shopping malls and retirement homes. The new policy was actively pursued 
during fiscal 2007 and is likely to be intensified further in the future.   
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responsible corporate behavior with respect to environmental, social and governance 
factors can have a positive influence on long-term financial performance. The CPPIB 
joined the UN-sponsored Principles of Responsible Investment and also belongs to the 
Canadian Coalition for Good Governance and the International Corporate Governance 
Network. 
  
3.5  Implementation of Investment Strategy 
 
Implementation of the investment strategy is the responsibility of executive management. 
Initially, reflecting the emphasis on passive investment and the small complement of 
staff, an external manager was retained to replicate the Toronto Stock Exchange 300 
Index, while a second fund manager was hired to replicate the S&P 500 Index in the US 
and the EAFE Index overseas. Complying with investment regulations, 80 percent of new 
funds were invested in Canadian equities and 20 percent in foreign equities.   
 
In 2003 responsibility for passive investing in public equities was transferred to internal 
managers. Customized indexing was adopted to include a broader selection of stocks and 
allow investments in small capitalization firms that were excluded from existing market 
indices.  Public equities were transferred from pooled and mutual index funds managed 
by external managers to a segregated own account with a new custodian. Transition 
managers were retained to assist in investing large amounts of cash in domestic and 
foreign markets with minimal market impact. The CPPIB began using a conventional 
derivatives program, including equity index swaps and futures, to manage risk, enhance 
returns, and provide liquidity. It also participated in a securities lending program to 
enhance investment returns. 
 
In 2004 a review of the strategic direction was undertaken. This was a response to the 
growing need to develop successful active management strategies, including new 
benchmarks and risk management, to deal with the anticipated quadrupling of assets 
under management. It was decided to adopt customized indexing by economic sector 
rather than geographic region. Twelve global economic sectors were identified. The new 
policy was prompted by the over-representation of some sectors in the Canadian equity 
market (financial services, energy) and the under-representation of other sectors (health-
care).  
 
External managers were appointed to implement an innovative active overlay strategy. 
The contracts for external managers are based on performance fees that involve a small 
basic retainer fee and a share of profits over agreed benchmarks. The criteria for selecting 
the external managers of the active overlay program include extensive expertise, 
excellent risk management, clearly articulated investment processes, and proven ability to 
handle a large and growing investment mandate. The CPPIB maintains relationships with 
well over 70 private investment, real estate and infrastructure groups.  
 
A major expansion of staff took place in the last three fiscal years reflecting the new 
responsibilities, e.g., cash and liquidity management for CPP, and the new emphasis on 
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have been appointed and new groups have been created to manage active strategies in the 
three investment departments that had been established in earlier years.  Staff expansion 
is likely to continue in fiscal 2008 and beyond. 
 
3.6 Investment  Performance 
 
The share of CPP assets managed by the CPPIB increased steadily over the years (Table 
3.2). All CPP assets were effectively transferred to the CPPIB by the end of March 2007. 
 
Table 3.2: Asset Composition, CPPIB and FDF, 2000-2007 
End  March  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
percent  of  total          
CCPIB  Assets  5.4 14.8 26.7 31.5 46.5 72.1 90.4 99.4 
FDF  Assets  94.6 85.2 73.3 68.5 53.5 27.9  9.6  0.6 
Source: CPPIB Annual Reports 
 
Asset allocation reflected the legacy of a large volume of non-tradable government bonds 
on the books of CPP and the decision to invest all new cash flow in equities. Fixed-
income instruments declined from 95 percent of the total in 2000 to 25 percent in 2007. 
Public equities in Canada and overseas reached 58 percent in 2007, while alternative 
assets, including private equity, real estate and infrastructure projects reached nearly 14 
percent in 2007 (Table 3.3). This is likely to increase further in the future both because of 
past commitments that are gradually reaching the realization stage and because of 
increased emphasis on such investments. Inflation-linked bonds made up 3 percent of 
total assets.      
 
Table 3.3: Asset Allocation of CPP Assets, 2000-2007 
End  March  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
p e r c e n t   o f   t o t a l           
Public  Equities  5.4 14.7 25.9 28.1 42.7 56.2 58.5 57.9 
Private  Equities  0.0 0.0 0.7 2.7 2.6 3.6 4.5 6.9 
Real  Estate  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.5 1.0 1.0 4.3 4.9 
Inflation-Linked  Bonds  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.1 3.3 
Infrastructure  0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.3 1.9 
Bonds  80.4 72.7 60.8 55.8 42.8 35.2 27.8 25.0 
Cash & Money Market   14.2  12.7  12.5  12.9  10.9  3.8  0.6  0.1 
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: CPPIB Annual Reports 
 
Investment returns for all CPP assets, including the non-marketable bonds that originally 
resided with the FDF and the assets managed by CPPIB, averaged 8.2 percent over the 
period 2000-2007. The returns exhibited significant fluctuation from year to year, 
reflecting the high volatility of returns of global equity markets (Table 3.4). 
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Table 3.4: Investment Returns on CPP Assets, 2000-2007 
Fiscal  Years  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
p e r c e n t           
CPP  Assets  3.2 7.0 4.0  -1.5  17.6 8.5  15.5  12.9 
Source: CPPIB Annual Reports 
 
Annual data on excess returns over the benchmark portfolio show that very large excess 
returns of the order of 8 percent were realized in 2001 (Table 3.5). This is explained by 
the decision to reduce exposure to Nortel Networks that accounted at the time for 35 
percent of the Toronto market and whose share price collapsed when the bubble burst. 
Excess returns were substantially negative in 2004 and 2006, but rebounded strongly in 
2007, when they reached 2.5 percent of assets.  
 
However, the benchmark used for the 2007 calculation is the new simplified Reference 
Portfolio, which is not designed to reflect the full riskiness of the actual portfolio. A 
Risk/Return Accountability Framework is used to measure excess returns, net of fees, on 
a risk-adjusted basis. However, it is not clear how the volatility of excess returns on 
investments in private equity, real estate and infrastructure is taken into account. Over the 
whole period, excess returns equaled 0.9 percent (90 basis points). If the special result of 
2001 is not taken into account, the average excess return becomes a negative 0.1 percent 
(minus 10 basis points). 
 
Table 3.5: Excess Returns, 2000-2006 
Percent  of  assets  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
          
Canadian  Equities  -0.2  10.9 1.2 0.2  -2.7 0.2  -2.6 n/a 
Foreign  Equities  0.5 0.7 0.5 0.4  -5.0 1.8  -0.7 n/a 
Real return assets      1.5  -59.9  35.2  1.1  -7.0  n/a 
Nominal Fixed Income            -0.7  -0.8      n/a 
Total  Portfolio  0.8 8.4 1.0  -0.8  -2.7 0.8  -2.1 2.5 
Source: CPPIB Annual Reports 
 
The experience of the past few years suggests the need for a closer examination of the 
decision to expand active management and engage in principal investing. The 
performance of the past few years may reflect both large initial expenditures and delayed 
realization of potential gains. However, such patterns need to be analyzed and evaluated 
carefully and to be closely monitored. 
 
Unlike the NBIM in Norway, the CPPIB does not document the contribution of internal 
and external management to the generation of excess returns over the benchmark targets. 
This may reflect the growing focus on alternative asset classes, which involve high 
upfront investment management expenses.  
 
In practice, investment expenses, including external management fees, are included in the 
capital cost of projects. Public securities are marked-to-market on a daily basis, but assets 
that are not traded on public markets are subject to ‘fair value’ accounting on a quarterly 
or annual basis. Fair values are obtained from external managers and are based on 
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reflected in unrealized gains.  Thus, the CPPIB effectively deducts management expenses 
from investment income. The same approach is followed with trading commissions paid 
to brokers. The result of this approach is to understate both investment returns and 
operating costs.  
 
Documenting the contribution of different strategies to excess returns deserves detailed 
consideration in view of the claims that active management, investing in alternative 
assets, as well as principal investing are all crucial for enhancing the investment returns 
and achieving excess returns over passive investment in public markets. 
 
The operating costs of the CPPIB have increased in absolute dollar terms as a result of 
the huge growth of assets under management and the expansion of staff. Although they 
declined in relation to total assets up to fiscal 2006, they rose in 2007 (Table 3.6). 
However, external management expenses for public markets as well as private equity, 
real estate and infrastructure have been much higher relative to average total assets. 
Trading commissions paid to brokers were very high in 2006 because of the realignment 
of the portfolio of public equities. 
 
At first sight, the operating costs of the CPPIB appear low and comparable to those of the 
most efficient pension fund management institutions around the world, like the TSP in 
the US, ATP in Denmark, or the NBIM in Norway. In reality, however, total operating 
costs are much higher than the costs of these other institutions. First, internal operating 
cost rose to 11 basis points in 2007, implying a higher cost function. Second, and more 
importantly, the costs of these other institutions include investment fees paid to external 
managers. Total external management fees and trading commissions of the CPPIB are 
deducted from investment income. They amounted to around 20 basis points in the last 
couple of years, but equaled nearly 35 basis points in 2003.  Adding external 
management fees and trading commissions to total operating costs raises their level to 
between 28 and 42 basis points over the last 5 years.
24 
 
Table 3.6: Operating Expenses in relation to CPPIB Managed Assets, 2000-2007 
Fiscal  Years  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
in  basis  points          
Operating  Costs  27.5  12 9 7 7 7  7.1  11.1 
Public  Mrkts  Ext  Exp    2.5 3.1 2.8 1.1 0.3 3.6 4.1 1.0 
Private  Equity  Fees*      8.4 29.6 25.4 15.3 11.8 12.8 
Private Real Ext Fees*        0.2  1.7  1.0  0.8  1.5 
Infrastructure  Fees*         0.1 0.4 0.7 0.5 
Total  Extern  Fees*  2.5  3.1 11.2 30.9 27.6 20.3 17.4 15.8 
Trading  Commissions*     3.7 3.8 5.6 2.4 3.8 3.8 
Source: Own calculations on reported CPPIB data  
                                                 
24 It should be noted that reported operating costs of most pension funds do not include investment 
management fees charged indirectly for participations in investment funds.  
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3.7 Concluding  Remarks 
 
The CPPIB operates with a robust governance structure that emphasizes two important 
principles: independence from government (and the implied insulation from political 
pressures); and full public accountability and transparency. The first principle is fulfilled 
by using a unique two-stage process in the selection of board directors. Candidates are 
first identified by a nominating committee and then selected by the government. Public 
accountability is served by a high level of transparency and public disclosure and by 
independent reviews and examinations. 
  
Initially, the CPPIB operated with a small staff of investment professionals and 
outsourced investment management. As assets grew, external passive management was 
replaced by an internally managed passive portfolio. Gradually, the portfolio was further 
diversified into private equity and then real estate, infrastructure and inflation-linked 
bonds. An externally managed active overlay program was also introduced to improve 
the risk/return profile. The growth in assets and complexity necessitated a large 
expansion in staff as well as management systems.     
 
In fiscal 2006 a major shift in investment philosophy was articulated. The CPPIB decided 
to expand its internal active management in both the Canadian and US equity markets, 
build a short-term trading capability, and expand its role as principal investor in private 
equity ventures and corporate restructurings. The new approach is predicated on the long 
investment horizon of the fund and a high level of risk tolerance. It has implied a large 
expansion of staff and significant increase in staff costs and executive compensation as 
well as a major growth of investment expenses. Other large public pension funds, such as 
the Ontario Teachers Pension Plan (OTPP) and the Caisse de Dépôt et Placement du 
Québec (CDPQ), have reached similar conclusions and have adopted a similar approach. 
In fact, OTPP was a leading member of the group of investors that won the Bell Canada 
takeover battle, while CDPQ was for a while a member of the CPPIB group, but 
withdrew before the battle was over.  
 
The new approach entails a very significant change in the economic role played by public 
pension funds. The current operations of the CPPIB are very different from those 
envisaged by its original creation as a single-purpose corporation dedicated to increasing 
the long-term value of CPP assets through prudent investments. The full implications, 
likely benefits, potential risks and possible complications of the new approach need to be 
closely monitored and evaluated in a wide public forum.      
 
 




The National Pensions Reserve Fund (NPRF) and an independent NRPF Commission 
were created in 2000 to manage assets to meet the growing financial pressures of 
demographic aging. The purpose of the fund is to partially prefund the cost of social 
welfare pensions and public service pensions to be paid from 2025 until at least 2055. 
 
The pension support ratio in Ireland is projected to fall from 5.25 contributors for each 
pensioner at present to 3.4 in 2025 and 1.8 in 2055. This decline is less pronounced than 
in the majority of EU countries but even so the cost of social welfare pensions was 
expected to rise, if social pensions remained indexed to wages, from 4.8 percent of GDP 
in 1999 to 8 percent in 2056 (Maher 2004). In addition, the government is facing a 
rapidly rising cost of public service pensions.  In response to these likely future financial 
pressures from demographic aging, the Irish authorities decided to build a fund that 
would be able to meet about one-third of the cost of public pensions (social welfare and 
public service) between 2025 and 2055 and possibly beyond. The fund is designed to 
underpin the long-term sustainability of existing pension arrangements.   
 
4.2 Funding  Sources 
 
The NPRF is funded with annual government contributions (1 percent of GNP) and 
privatization proceeds. Irish public debt was substantially reduced during the 1990s. It 
now amounts to around 20 percent of GDP. The policy choice facing the Irish authorities 
lied between reducing further the level of public debt and creating the new fund. The 
authorities decided in favor of the latter because the level of the debt was already low, a 
certain presence of the Irish government in the European debt market was desirable, and 
creating the new fund could be beneficial both in buttressing confidence in the future of 
public pensions and in generating financial returns in excess of the financial costs of 
public debt. 
 
Table 4.1: Total Assets of the NPRF, 2001-2006 
end December  2001  2002  2003 2004 2005 2006 
        
Annual  Transfers  (bn  EUR)  7.5 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4 
Percent  of  GNP  7.7 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 
Percent  of  GDP  6.4 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 
        
Total Assets (bn EUR)   7.7  7.4  9.6  11.7  15.4  18.9 
Percent  of  GNP  7.9 7.1 8.6 9.5  11.4  12.6 
Percent  of  GDP  6.6 5.7 6.9 7.9 9.6  10.8 
Source: NPRF and IFS 
 
The first transfer of funds was made in April 2001. It included 6.5 billion EUR that had 
been accumulated in a temporary holding fund pending the creation of the NPRF. At the 
end of the first nine months of operation in December 2001, total assets amounted to 7.7 
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25  Total assets 
reached 18.9 billion EUR at the end of 2006 (Table 4.1), corresponding to 12.6 percent of 
GNP (or 10.8 percent of GDP).  
 
4.3  Institutional Structure and Fund Governance 
 
The NPRF is managed by a Commission that has been established as a body corporate 
with absolute discretion to control, manage and invest the assets of the fund, acting 
through the Manager.  
 
The Commission has the right to appoint the manager of the fund and delegate to the 
manager any of its functions as it considers appropriate or expedient. The Commission 
also appoints investment managers, custodians, consultants and other service providers. 
The Commission was required by the National Pensions Reserve Fund Act, 2000 to 
appoint the National Treasury Management Agency (NTMA) as the first executive 
manager of the fund for a period of 10 years. The management expenses of the NTMA 
are covered by the Ministry of Finance but all other expenses are charged to the NPRF. 
Following this first period, and acting in consultation with the Minister and with his or 
her consent, the Commission may appoint the NTMA or any other firm to act as manager 
for a five-year period.  
 
The Commission consists of seven commissioners, who are appointed for staggered 
terms. The commissioners must be ‘fit and proper’ persons. The act specifies that the 
Minister shall appoint persons to be commissioners who have acquired substantial 
expertise and experience at a senior level in a broad range of areas, including investment 
or international business management, finance or economics, law, actuarial practice, 
accountancy and auditing, civil service, trade union representation, pension industry, and 
consumer protection. There is no requirement for a balanced composition in terms of 
background and expertise, although the minister is required to ensure an equitable 
balance between men and women in the composition of the Commission. Despite the fast 
growing complexity of financial instruments and strategies, there is no requirement that a 
sufficient number of commissioners should have adequate knowledge of the potential 
benefits and risks of such products and practices.  
 
The commissioners are appointed by the Minister of Finance for five-year terms and can 
only be removed for just cause. Four of the first ordinary members of the Commission 
were appointed for shorter three and four-year terms to allow a staggering of future 
appointments. The Chief Executive of the NTMA is an ex officio member of the 
Commission. Three of the other six founding commissioners were foreign nationals. 
Apart from the ex officio member, all other commissioners cannot serve more than two 
consecutive terms of office.   
 
                                                 
25 Because of the presence in Ireland of a large number of multinational companies, GNP fluctuates 
between 80 and 85 percent of GDP, after deducting net income earned by foreigners. The 1 percent of GNP 
annual contribution from the budget corresponds to 0.8 percent of GDP. 
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allocation, the Commission is also required to conduct, from time to time, an assessment 
of the projected profile of public outlays on pensions. 
 
The accounts of the fund must be audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General. The 
Commission is required to publish an annual report of its activities and of the audited 
accounts of the fund. The annual report must include information on investment strategy, 
investment return, asset valuation, investment management and custody arrangements, 
fees, commissions and other expenses incurred by the Commission and the Manager. 
 
As part of its fund governance guidelines, the Commission appointed a formal Audit 
Committee in 2002. The firm of PricewaterhouseCoopers was appointed to carry out an 
internal audit of the fund with special emphasis on the controls in place in the custodian 
and the NTMA.  The results of this audit, which were received in April 2003, were 
satisfactory and were forwarded to the statutory auditor of the fund. Fund guidelines 
require full disclosure of conflicts of interest and abstention from voting in those cases. 
The Ethics in Public Office Act, 1995 has been applied to the Commission and the 
NTMA with effect from the beginning of 2005.  
 
Two additional committees were created in 2005: the Property Investment Committee to 
advise the NTMA on real estate investments and monitor implementation of the agreed 
program; and the Private Equity Investment Committee, with similar duties in connection 
with private equity investments. The first of these committees has four members (two 
commissioners and two external members), while the second has six members (four 
commissioners and two external members).   
 
Special emphasis is placed on monitoring and controlling both financial (market) and 
operational risks. To this end, the NTMA has installed information technology systems 
and developed detailed control procedures in line with industry best practice. Tracking 
error is closely monitored on a daily basis at both fund and individual manager level. 
However, investments in private equity, property and pooled funds are excluded from the 
calculation of the tracking error limit. Work is under way to include these asset classes in 
the risk budgeting framework.  
 
A comprehensive range of controls has been put in place to minimize operational risk. 
Implementation of the controls is monitored by the NTMA's Internal Control Unit (ICU). 
PricewaterhouseCoopers supplements the work of the ICU, while the Commission's 
Audit Committee is also actively involved in ensuring the effectiveness of internal 
controls.  
 
The Chairperson of the Commission is required to appear before and give evidence to the 
Committee of Public Accounts of the Irish Parliament on fund policies and performance, 
while the Chief Executive of the Manager (NTMA) is also required to give evidence to 
the Committee on the regularity and propriety of all transactions on the fund and on the 
economy and efficiency of the Commission and the Manager in regard to the expenses of 
operation of the fund. 
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In April 2006, the Commission joined a group of over 30 large institutional investors in 
signing the Principles of Responsible Investing that have been sponsored by the United 
Nations. The aim of the principles is to integrate consideration of environmental, social 
and governance issues into investment decision-making and ownership practices and 
thereby improve long-term returns.            
 
4.4  Investment Policy Objectives and Strategic Asset Allocation 
 
The Commission is responsible for setting the strategic asset allocation of the fund. It is 
required to invest the assets with a view to securing an optimal return but subject to an 
acceptable level of risk. It is not allowed to invest in Irish government securities. Taking 
into account its long investment horizon, resulting from the provision that there will be 
no withdrawals from the fund for 25 years, the Commission adopted as its investment 
policy objective the maximization of the terminal wealth of the fund. 
 
Following a competitive bidding organized by NTMA, the Commission hired an external 
consultant, Mercer Investment Consulting Limited, to advise on setting its asset 
allocation strategy. The consultant advised and the Commission accepted a broad 
allocation of 80 percent equities and 20 percent bonds. A benchmark portfolio was then 
created that consisted of 40 percent Eurozone equities, 40 percent non-Eurozone equities 
(split between 26.4 percent US, 6.8 percent Europe ex Eurozone, 5.2 percent Japan and 
1.6 percent Pacific Basin) and 20 percent Eurozone bonds.  
 
The eurozone market was chosen as the domestic market both because of Ireland's 
adoption of the euro and because the Irish equity market is too small, accounting for less 
than 1 percent of global equities. Interestingly, the benchmark did not include an 
allocation to emerging markets. However, the Commission initiated a study to examine 
the appropriateness of including emerging markets and some other asset classes, such as 
small capitalization quoted equities, property, private equity and corporate bonds. 
Following Mercer's advice, the Commission also decided to adopt a currency overlay 
strategy and hedge half of the non-Eurozone foreign currency exposure. 
 
The Commission then considered the choice between active and passive management. It 
opted for a mixed approach that allocated 15 percent in passive bond management, 5 
percent in active bond management, 37 percent in passive equities, and 43 percent in 
active equities. Active equity managers were given considerable leeway with tracking 
error targets of between 5 and 6 percent. However, the overall expected tracking error 
was calibrated to stay within 1.25 percent on an annual basis. 
 
In 2003, following a detailed review, the Commission approved mandates for small cap 
equities and corporate bonds and made fund allocations to property and infrastructure 
projects. The Commission also approved investing in private equity. A total of 4 percent 
was allocated to real estate, 2 percent for Eurozone corporate bonds and 2 percent for 
small caps. No decision was made to allocate funds to emerging markets. 
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alternative asset classes, including real estate, private equity and commodities, of up to 18 
percent of total assets. The objective was to increase the fund's potential long-term return 
without substantially changing its risk profile. The Commission also decided to increase 
its small cap allocation from 2 to 4 percent and to allocate 2 percent to emerging market 
equities.  
 
After reviewing the assumptions underpinning the strategic asset allocation, the 
Commission introduced in 2006 slight adjustments to the targets adopted for 2009 (Table 
4.2). The main adjustments included a reduction in large cap equities and an increased 
allocation to emerging markets. The latter underscores the opportunities for higher 
returns offered by these markets but also recognizes the progress made by many 
developing countries in promoting financial stability and strengthening the regulation and 
supervision of their financial markets.  
 
Unlike public pension funds in Canada, the Commission has not advocated engaging in 
principal investing or short-term trading. Much of the portfolio in bonds and large caps 
continues to be passively managed, while investments in alternative classes are made 
through investment funds. 
 
Table 4.2: Strategic Asset Allocation: 2009 Targets 
percent  2004 Review  2006 Review 
    
Large Cap Equity  63  56 
Small Cap Equity    4    5 
Emerging Markets Equity    2    5 
Total Quoted Equity  69 66 
    
Private Equity    8  10 
Property    8    8 
Commodities    2    2 
Total Alternative Assets  18 20 
    
Bonds 13  13 
Currency Funds      1 
Total Monetary Assets  13 14 
Source: NPRF 
 
4.5  Implementation of Investment Strategy 
 
The appointment of NTMA as the operational manager of the fund is a natural choice for 
the NPRF. The NTMA is responsible for managing the public debt of Ireland with the 
objective to minimize the cost of public debt subject to a prudent level of risk. This is 
very similar to asset management objective to maximize the investment return subject to 
a prudent level of risk. The NPRF is not allowed to invest in Irish government securities 
and thus there is no direct conflict of interest between the two main functions of the 
NTMA. When investments in infrastructure projects are considered, proper Chinese walls 
are put in place between the managers of the NPRF and the managers of infrastructure 
projects. 
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Following the appointment of NTMA as manager and the selection of Mercer Investment 
Consulting Limited as external consultant on asset allocation strategy, the Commission 
considered the appointment of external asset managers. It was decided, following the 
advice of the external consultant, to seek to employ specialist asset managers, dealing 
with a particular asset class, rather than appoint balanced managers that would deal with 
multiple asset classes.  
 
The Commission also decided to appoint 15 external asset managers, while delegating 
responsibility for the passive bond management and the currency overlay program to the 
NTMA. The NTMA was instructed to organize a competitive tender under EU public 
procurement rules for the selection of external asset managers. A special electronic 
tendering website was created because of the anticipated large volume of interest. In 
total, the Commission received 581 expressions of interest from some 200 managers. 
Respondents had to complete a detailed questionnaire that had been designed by the 
NTMA in consultation with Frank Russell Company.  
 
The next stage in the selection process was the dispatch of 178 invitations to tender to 
some 100 managers. The selection criteria included strength of the firm, resources, 
caliber of participating individuals, relevant experience, quality of risk control 
framework, quality of administration and reporting, ability to manage conflicts of 
interest, level of fees, historical performance, ability to meet investment objectives, and 
terms of required legal agreement or contract. 158 valid tenders were received and 
following a rigorous evaluation the Commission proceeded to award 15 external 
mandates. The whole process took several months. Pending the selection of external 
managers, the assets of the fund were held in bank time deposits. 
 
The Commission also appointed a transition manager, whose function is to purchase in an 
efficient and cost effective manner on behalf of the fund the securities required by the 
individual asset managers. This approach allows a detailed monitoring of market entry 
costs. It permits the achievement of economies of scale through the use of block 
purchases and also seeks to minimize the costs of market impact through careful timing 
of the execution of trades. Following a competitive tender, Watson Wyatt was appointed 
to advice on the selection of transition manager. After a two-stage process similar to that 
adopted for the selection of asset managers, Morgan Stanley International was appointed 
as transition manager.      
 
A further competition was held under the restricted procedure of the EU Public 
Procurement Directive for the appointment of a global custodian who is responsible for 
the safe custody of all assets, independently of the investment managers. ABN Amro 
Mellon was appointed as global custodian. Its services include transaction settlement, 
safekeeping, collection of income, claiming of tax refunds, cash sweeps, fund accounting 
and reporting, and securities lending.    
 
The Commission also participates in a commission recapture program administered by 
Frank Russell Securities. Under this program, asset managers are requested, subject to 
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brokers, who refund some of their commission income to the NPRF.  
 
Close monitoring of the performance of external managers is ensured by the development 
of a sophisticated system of reporting and measurement of risks and returns that 
complements the work of the custodian. Formal review meetings of external asset 
managers are held by the NTMA and the latter's opinion is then considered by the 
Commission. During 2003, one mandate was terminated. 
 
The Commission made considerable progress in 2004 and 2005 implementing the revised 
investment strategy that emphasized increased allocations in small caps, private equity, 
real estate and commodities. New mandates were awarded following the same 
competitive process as with the original appointments.  
   
Much of the portfolio, covering half of the large cap allocation, is passively managed. 
But active management, especially for less liquid assets, is growing. This has resulted in 
the payment of increasing management fees to external managers.  
 
4.6 Investment  Performance 
 
In 2001 all assets were invested in cash. Implementation of the strategic asset allocation 
was slowed down in 2002 because of adverse market conditions. Thus, at the end of 2002 
57 percent was invested in real assets and 43 percent in monetary assets compared with 
the long-term target of 80/20 in real and monetary assets. Considerable progress was 
made in 2003 in aligning the portfolio composition to the long-term strategic objectives.  
 
Real assets now account for just over 80 percent of assets (Table 4.3). Alternative assets 
amount to nearly 5 percent of assets compared to the target of 20 percent by 2009. Rather 
surprisingly, bank deposits continue to represent over 5 percent of assets. The equity 
portfolio is equally divided between Eurozone and global equities. Investments in Irish 
equities are less than 1 percent of total assets. Investments in Irish government bonds are 
not allowed; all investments in government bonds are in bonds of other Eurozone 
countries. 
 
Table 4.3: Asset Allocation, 2001-2006 
end December  2001  2002  2003 2004 2005 2006 
p e r c e n t         
Equities   56.8 70.8 76.1 77.9 75.7 
Commodities       1.3  1.1 
Property       0.6  3.2 
Private  Equity        0.5 
Government  Bonds   17.6 14.6 12.8 11.7 12.7 
Corporate  Bonds        0.5 
Foreign  Currency  Funds        0.5 
Bank  Deposits  100.0 25.7 14.6 11.1  8.4  5.8 
Total  100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Source: NPRF 
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volatility of equity market returns in the first decade of the new millennium (Table 4.4). 
The fund achieved a substantial excess return over its benchmark in 2001 and 2002 
mainly because of the delay in implementing its asset allocation strategy. This was partly 
caused by the long procedure imposed by EU regulations on public procurement, which 
delayed the selection of managers and the investment of cash during 2001. But it was also 
partly due to a deliberate decision to invest the funds slowly during 2002 because of the 
unsettled market conditions that prevailed at that time. Excess returns were highly 
negative in 2003 and 2004, but were close to zero in the last two years.  
 
Table 4.4: Investment Returns by Asset Class, 2001-2006 
percent  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
        
Equities    -29.6 18.1 10.4 26.9 14.0 
Bonds   10.7  4.2 11.3  8.9 -2.1 
P r o p e r t y         2 7 . 0  
Private  Equity        4.9 
Commodities       25.9  -23.9 
Cash  3.3 3.4 2.4 2.1 2.1 3.0 
All  Assets  3.3  -16.1 12.8  9.3 19.6 12.4 
Benchmark  -3.5  -21.6 16.6 11.2 20.1 12.2 
Excess  Returns  6.8  5.4 -3.8 -2.9 -0.5  0.2 
Source: NPRF 
 
The annualized average rate of return over the whole period 2001-2006 amounted to 6.5 
percent. This exceeded inflation by a comfortable margin. The real rate of return was 4.2 
percent. The overall average excess return amounted to 1.4 percent (140 basis points), 
though as just noted, this was the result of the fortunate delay in implementing the 
investment strategy.  
 
Equity returns averaged 5.8 percent, which was slightly below the 6.5 percent earned by 
the bond portfolio. However, in the long run, equities are likely to earn significantly more 
than bonds. Alternative asset classes, especially private equity and real estate, are 
expected to make a large relative contribution to investment income in the longer run. 
However, these asset classes incur high upfront expenses and thus it will be some time 
before their full results are realized. 
 
Operating expenses, including the expenses of NTMA, increased over time and amounted 
to 21 basis points in 2006 (Table 4.5). The combined Commission and NTMA expenses 
ranged between 6 and 7 basis points and are comparable to management expenses of 
other large pension funds. However, external management fees look high at over 15 basis 
points.  Investment management fees charged indirectly through participation in 
investment funds are not included in reported fees but are deducted from reported 
investment returns. 
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Table 4.5: Operating Expenses, 2001-2006 
basis  points  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
        
External  Management  Fees    7.3 14.1 15.5 15.9 14.6 
Commission  Costs  1.4 3.6 3.2 2.1 3.3 2.8 
Total  NPRF  Costs  1.4 10.9 17.3 17.6 19.2 17.4 
NTMA  Expenses  2.7 3.1 3.9 3.3 3.5 3.4 
Total  Operating  Costs  4.1 14.0 21.2 20.9 22.7 20.8 
Source: NPRF 
 
The NTMA employs 17 people to run the operations of the fund. The Commission does 
not have any staff but incurs all expenses related to IT systems, custodians, consultants, 
legal fees and the fees and expenses of commissioners. 
 
4.7 Concluding  Remarks 
 
The NPRF has been created with a strong governance structure. It is managed by a small 
independent Commission of experts rather than representatives of stakeholders. The 
Commission has absolute discretion to control, manage and invest the assets of the fund, 
but is required to consult with the Minister and obtain his or her consent in the 
appointment of the manager. The appointment of the NTMA as first manager for ten 
years was required by the Act that created the fund. 
 
The Commission is responsible for formulating the investment policy objectives and 
setting the strategic asset allocation of the fund. Taking into account its long investment 
horizon, it has set a broad allocation of 80 percent equities and 20 percent bonds. The 
eurozone market was chosen as the domestic market. Thus, investments in Irish equities 
account for less than one percent of assets, while the fund is not allowed to invest in Irish 
government securities. The equity portfolio is equally divided between Eurozone and 
global equities, while half of the foreign currency exposure is hedged. 
 
Active management is used for half the portfolio. External asset managers are used for 
specialized mandates. The Commission also appointed a transition manager and a global 
custodian. It participates in both securities lending and recapture of broker commissions. 
The asset allocation strategy has been refined over time, increasing allocations to 
emerging markets (5 percent) as well as alternative assets (20 percent). However, the 
Commission has not advocated engaging in either principal investing or short-term 
trading.  
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The New Zealand Superannuation Fund (NZSF) and the Guardians of the NZSF were 
established in October 2001 by the New Zealand Superannuation Act 2001. The aim of 
the fund is to partially fund the universal public pension that is paid by the government to 
all old-age persons residing in New Zealand. The accumulation of the fund and its use 
during the payout phase will offset the steep increase in the cost of the universal pension, 
particularly after 2020. The fund will thus smooth out the financial burden on the budget 
from the impact of demographic aging on the universal pension scheme. 
 
The government decided to set aside substantial capital contributions for the fund over 
the ensuing twenty years. As a result, the fund is expected to grow to around 100 billion 
NZD by 2023, after which date funds may be withdrawn to meet part of the increased 
cost of universal pensions. With public debt amounting to only 14 percent of GDP, New 
Zealand, like Ireland and Norway, did not face a difficult policy dilemma in deciding to 
create the fund. If anything, creating the fund and investing in global assets is likely to 
earn a higher rate of return than the interest cost of the public debt.  
 
5.2 Funding  Sources 
 
The NZSF is funded by annual government contributions. These vary from year to year 
and depend on a formula that calculates annually the required contribution for meeting 
the financial objective of the fund. This is not the maintenance of a particular funding 
ratio but the smoothing out of the annual cost of universal pensions. Instead of doubling 
the annual cost would rise by half if the fund policies are successful (McCulloch and 
Frances 2004).  The contribution rate reached 1.5 percent of GDP in 2006. The first 
transfer of contributions was made in October 2003. This included funds that had been 
set aside in fiscal 2002 and 2003 in anticipation of the creation of the fund. 
 
Table 5.1: Total Assets of the NZSF, 2004-2006 
end  June  2004 2005 2006 
     
Annual Transfers (bn NZD)  3.8  2.1  2.3 
Percent  of  GDP  2.5 1.3 1.5 
     
Total Assets (bn NZD)   4.0  6.6  10.1 
Percent  of  GDP  2.7 4.2 6.3 
Source: NZSF and IFS 
 
Total assets of the NZSF rose from 4 billion NZD (or 2.7% of GDP) in June 2004 to 10 
billion NZD, corresponding to 6.3% of GDP in June 2006 (Table 5.1). The growth of 
assets also reflected the high level of net investment returns. As the fund was created 
after the recovery of global equity markets from the bursting of the high tech bubble in 
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the other three funds examined in this paper. 
 
5.3  Institutional Structure and Fund Governance 
 
The Board of Guardians consists of six professionals who are appointed by the 
government after a proposal by an independent nominating committee. The first Board 
was appointed in August 2002. The act specifies that only persons who, in the opinion of 
the minister, have substantial experience, training and expertise in the management of 
financial investments, can be appointed to the board.  
 
The Board of Guardians is responsible for investing the fund on a commercial and 
prudent basis in order to maximize investment returns without incurring undue risks. The 
Board is charged with investing the fund in a manner consistent with best practice 
portfolio management. 
 
The Board is required to be transparent in its activities. A formal independent review of 
the performance of the Board will be carried out at least every five years and be reported 
to Parliament, while the New Zealand Treasury will monitor its activities on a regular 
basis. While accountable to government, the Board and the fund operate at arm's length 
from it. The Act gives the Minister of Finance limited powers of direction on the 
government's expectations of fund performance, but no such directions have been issued 
so far. 
 
The Board established 5 board committees. The Audit and Governance Committee is 
responsible for overseeing the financial reporting of the fund and the establishment of 
internal risk control policies. There are also board committees on Manager Selection, 
Responsible Investing, Communications, and Employee Policy and Remuneration. Two 
of these committees (on Manager Selection and Communications) were eliminated in 
fiscal 2004.  
 
An independent review of the performance of the fund was carried out in fiscal 2005. 
This confirmed that the investment policies and operating model of the fund were 
appropriate. It also concurred with the Board's view to increase the allocation to 
alternative assets. 
 
The Board is taking steps to enhance the database of fund transactions to ensure future 
capability for portfolio analysis. It is also formalizing its internal control policies and 
building a comprehensive risk management plan.  
 
In early 2006, the fund joined the UN initiative on corporate governance and adopted the 
Principles of Responsible Investing.  
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5.4  Investment Policy Objectives and Strategic Asset Allocation 
 
The Board is responsible for setting the strategic asset allocation of the fund.  It hired an 
external adviser, Mercer Investment Consulting, in February 2003 to help determine its 
asset strategy. The report of the adviser was reviewed by the Board, senior management, 
and a second adviser - Russell Investment Group. The Board also researched the 
processes and structure of similar funds overseas.  
 
All this research and advice pointed in the same directions. First, international best 
practice demanded wide diversification of investments across different investment sectors 
and localities. Second, the best way to maximize long-term returns is to invest a large 
proportion of the fund in growth assets, such as equities and property. While subject to 
greater short-term volatility, these assets are expected to substantially outperform over a 
20-year period defensive assets, such as cash and fixed-income securities. 
 
The first strategic asset allocation was finalized in July 2003. It emphasized the 
importance of investing in ‘growth’ assets and risk diversification. The basic allocation 
was 80 percent ‘growth’ assets and 20 percent ‘defensive’ assets. Allocations to local 
equities were limited to 7.5% of total assets. However, total assets to be invested in New 
Zealand, including bonds and property, were targeted at 22 percent. The fund's 
performance target is set to exceed the risk-free rate of return by 2.5 percentage points 
(250 basis points) on average over rolling five-year periods.   
 
The asset allocation was reviewed in fiscal 2005 and a decision was taken to expand 
allocations in alternative assets to 35 percent of total assets (Table 5.2). This implied a 
move away from listed equities and also required a major effort to create an appropriate 
infrastructure. Progress was made in establishing specific strategies and appointing 
specialist advisers. 
 
Table 5.2: Strategic Asset Allocation 
percent  2003 Report  2005 Review 
    
NZ Equities    7.5   7.5 
Large/Mid Cap  44.5  34.5 
Small Cap  12    6.0 
Emerging Markets    3    2.0 
Total Listed Equities  67  50 
Property    6  10 
Other    7  25 
Total Alternative Assets  13  35 
Total Growth Assets  80  85 
NZ Fixed Interest  10   
Global Fixed Interest  10   
Total Defensive Assets  20  15 
Source: NZSF 
 
In addition to expanding the allocation to alternative assets, the fund adopted multi-
strategy mandates and started paying performance fees to active managers. During 2006 
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effective utilization of active manager risk were completed. The proportion of active risk 
in the portfolio, while still modest, has been increased. Thus, the NZSF, like the funds in 
Canada, Ireland and Norway, has followed the same path of starting with a largely 
passive management and then moving quite rapidly to adopting a more active approach 
that seeks to raise expected returns while keeping risks under control. 
 
The policy for hedging foreign currency risk has been set at a very high level. In 2006 72 
percent of the fund's exposure in global growth assets and 100 percent of the global fixed 
interest portfolio were hedged back to New Zealand dollars.    
 
5.5  Implementation of Investment Strategy 
 
The Board of Guardians appointed a Chief Executive in March 2003. Management is 
responsible for implementing the policy set by the Board and overseeing the effective 
performance of investment managers. A small executive staff is assisting the Board in 
selecting external managers, custodians and auditors, and monitoring their performance. 
In fiscal 2005, the total number of staff was 8 full-time investment officers and 3 support 
staff, up from 9 in fiscal 2004. The number reached 15 in 2006 but was expected to 
increase to 25 in fiscal 2007.  
 
After appointing the Chief Executive Officer and hiring key staff, the Board established 
Board committees, selected investment advisors to the fund, appointed legal and tax 
advisors, and selected BNP Paribas Securities as the fund's custodian to provide 
safekeeping of the investment assets and settle all transactions. The first investment 
managers were appointed in September 2003. All appointments were made after a 
rigorous selection process. 15 managers with 16 mandates were appointed during fiscal 
2004.   
 
The number of managers and mandates increased over time in line with the rising 
complexity of investment policy. In 2006 the fund employed 25 external managers with 
34 mandates. The performance of managers is monitored on a daily basis with the 
assistance of the global custodian. It is reviewed monthly by the Board against such 
criteria as the performance of their peers and their performance against benchmark 
returns, depending on the type of asset class they manage.  
 
The benchmarks used for assessing the performance of individual managers state very 
clearly that they should be based on the asset class for which the individual manager is 
selected and should reflect the degree of risk adopted by each manager. In contrast, as 
already noted above, the benchmark of the overall portfolio of the fund against which its 
performance is assessed has been defined as the risk-free rate of return plus an excess of 
2.5 percentage points (250 basis points). 
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5.6 Investment  Performance 
 
Asset allocation changed significantly when the new strategy decided in fiscal 2005 was 
put under implementation (Table 5.3). Investments in global equities, especially in larger 
cap equities, declined rapidly from 51 percent in 2004 to 40 percent in 2006. The long-
term target of the current strategy is to lower this further to 34.5 percent. The allocation 
to emerging markets has been reduced in the long-term strategy despite the recent strong 
performance of emerging markets and the promise of higher returns in the future as 
developing countries strengthen the regulation of their markets and seek to maintain 
financial stability. However, for the time being the share of emerging market equities has 
remained stable at 3.6 percent of total assets. 
 
A major expansion of investments in alternative assets from 3 to 20 percent of the total 
portfolio took place in fiscal 2006. This is expected to rise further in fiscal 2007 in 
implementation of the new target of 35 percent for this asset class.  
 
Table 5.3: Asset Allocation, 2004-2006 
percent of total assets  2004  2005  2006 
     
New  Zealand  Equities  9.9 8.4 7.6 
     
Large Cap Global Equities  50.7  43.2  40.2 
Small Cap Global Equities  11.2  9.3  8.6 
Emerging Market Equities  2.0  3.6  3.6 
Total  Global  Equities  63.9 56.2 52.4 
Total  Equities  73.8 64.6 60.0 
     
New Zealand Fixed Interest  12.1  16.0  14.4 
 Global Fixed Interest  14.1  16.1  5.7 
Total Fixed Interest  26.2  32.1  20.1 
     
Property   2.9 7.2 
Timber     3.6 
Infrastructure     3.8 
Other Alternative Assets    0.4  5.2 
Total Alternative Assets    3.3  19.8 
Source: NZSF 
 
Investments in timber (forestry) and infrastructure grew rapidly in 2006. The first 
involves the NZSF in a principal capacity.
26 The 2006 annual financial statements report 
major timber operating expenses, amortization of goodwill, and depletion of forestry 
                                                 
26 McCulloch and Frances (2004:185) note the NZSF is intended to be a portfolio of financial investments, 
not an operator of businesses. They also state that section 59 of the NZSF Act precludes it from taking a 
controlling interest in other entities. It is not clear if the timber operations would classify as a business 
operation. It is also not clear under what conditions would an expanded involvement in principal investing 
infringe the spirit of section 59.    
  59assets. However, although these are reported among fund operating expenses, they are in 
fact properly deducted from the investment income of timber assets.  
 
At the end of fiscal 2006, the private equity program had not yet been set in motion. It is 
not clear if the NZSF intends to act as a passive investor in private equity funds organized 
by other investment groups or whether it will follow the example of the CPPIB and 
become involved as a principal investor. 
 
Fund performance, net of investment management expenses, averaged 14.5 percent since 
its inception. This exceeded the risk-free rate by 8.3 percentage points and was much 
better than the target excess return of 2.5 percent over the risk-free rate. The fund projects 
a nominal return of 9 percentage points over the next 30 years and an excess return of 3.5 
percent. Annual results show the usual fluctuation from year to year (Table 5.4). 
 
Table 5.4: Investment Returns, 2004-2006 
percent  2004 2005 2006 
     
Return  on  Assets  10.4 14.1 19.2 
Risk Free Rate  5.3  6.3  6.8 
Excess Return  5.1  7.8  12.4 
Source: NZSF 
 
Because of the young age of the fund and its small size as well as the need to establish 
computing and information systems, operating expenses relative to average total assets 
are high by comparison with other large public pension funds. Operating expenses rose to 
71 basis points in 2006, up from 28 points in 2004 (Table 5.5). Investment management 
fees account for the lion's share of expenses. As already noted, the fund deducts these 
expenses from reported investment income.  
 
Table 5.5: Operating Expenses, 2004-2006 
basis  points  2004 2005 2006 
     
Manager  Fees  11.9 28.8 54.1 
Custodian  5.4 9.6 8.5 
Other fund expenses  1.9  2.5  3.1 
Guardian  Expenses  9.2 6.6 5.3 
Total  Expenses  28.3 47.5 71.1 
Source: NZSF 
 
5.7 Concluding  Remarks 
 
The NZSF has been created as a state entity with its own independent board and a long 
investment horizon. The board of directors consists of six professionals who are 
appointed by the government after a proposal by an independent nominating committee. 
The board is responsible for investing the fund on a commercial and prudent basis in 
order to maximize investment returns without incurring undue risks. The NZSF operates 
with a high level of transparency and public accountability. 
  
  60The first strategic asset allocation emphasized the importance of investing in ‘growth’ 
assets and risk diversification. The basic allocation was 80 percent ‘growth’ assets and 20 
percent ‘defensive’ assets. Allocations to local equities were limited to 7.5% of total 
assets, but total assets to be invested in New Zealand, including bonds and property, were 
targeted at 22 percent. The policy for hedging foreign currency risk has been set at a very 
high level. Over 70 percent of the fund's exposure in global growth assets and 100 
percent of the global fixed interest portfolio are hedged back to New Zealand dollars.    
 
The asset allocation was reviewed in fiscal 2005 and a decision was taken to expand 
allocations in alternative assets to 35 percent of total assets. In addition to expanding the 
allocation to alternative assets, the fund adopted multi-strategy mandates and began 
paying performance fees to active managers. Thus, like the public pension funds in 
Canada, Ireland and Norway, the NZSF started with a largely passive management and 
then moved quite rapidly to adopt a more active approach that seeks to raise expected 
returns while keeping risks under control. 
 
Asset allocation changed significantly following adoption of the 2005 strategy. 
Investments in large cap equities declined rapidly, while investments in alternative assets 
rose from 3 to 20 percent of the total portfolio. Investments in timber (forestry) and 
infrastructure also grew rapidly in 2006. The first of these involves the NZSF in a 
principal capacity. However, it is not clear if the NZSF intends to act as a principal or 
passive investor in its private equity investments. 
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